lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <8f3f3f41-a052-1975-69e2-49e1a662ecab@linux.ibm.com>
Date:   Wed, 22 Aug 2018 16:54:26 -0400
From:   Tony Krowiak <akrowiak@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
        Tony Krowiak <akrowiak@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        linux-s390@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     freude@...ibm.com, schwidefsky@...ibm.com,
        heiko.carstens@...ibm.com, borntraeger@...ibm.com,
        cohuck@...hat.com, kwankhede@...dia.com,
        bjsdjshi@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, pbonzini@...hat.com,
        alex.williamson@...hat.com, pmorel@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
        alifm@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, mjrosato@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
        jjherne@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, thuth@...hat.com,
        pasic@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, berrange@...hat.com,
        fiuczy@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, buendgen@...ibm.com,
        frankja@...ux.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 21/22] KVM: s390: CPU model support for AP
 virtualization

On 08/22/2018 07:19 AM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 13.08.2018 23:48, Tony Krowiak wrote:
>> From: Tony Krowiak <akrowiak@...ux.ibm.com>
>>
>> Introduces a new CPU model feature and two CPU model
>> facilities to support AP virtualization for KVM guests.
>>
>> CPU model feature:
>>
>> The KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_AP feature indicates that
>> AP instructions are available on the guest. This
>> feature will be enabled by the kernel only if the AP
>> instructions are installed on the linux host. This feature
>> must be specifically turned on for the KVM guest from
>> userspace to use the VFIO AP device driver for guest
>> access to AP devices.
>>
>> CPU model facilities:
>>
>> 1. AP Query Configuration Information (QCI) facility is installed.
>>
>>     This is indicated by setting facilities bit 12 for
>>     the guest. The kernel will not enable this facility
>>     for the guest if it is not set on the host.
>>
>>     If this facility is not set for the KVM guest, then only
>>     APQNs with an APQI less than 16 will be used by a Linux
>>     guest regardless of the matrix configuration for the virtual
>>     machine. This is a limitation of the Linux AP bus.
>>
>> 2. AP Facilities Test facility (APFT) is installed.
>>
>>     This is indicated by setting facilities bit 15 for
>>     the guest. The kernel will not enable this facility for
>>     the guest if it is not set on the host.
>>
>>     If this facility is not set for the KVM guest, then no
>>     AP devices will be available to the guest regardless of
>>     the guest's matrix configuration for the virtual
>>     machine. This is a limitation of the Linux AP bus.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tony Krowiak <akrowiak@...ux.ibm.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@...ux.ibm.com>
>> Tested-by: Michael Mueller <mimu@...ux.ibm.com>
>> Tested-by: Farhan Ali <alifm@...ux.ibm.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c         |    5 +++++
>>   arch/s390/tools/gen_facilities.c |    2 ++
>>   2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c
>> index 1e8cb67..d5e04d2 100644
>> --- a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c
>> +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c
>> @@ -367,6 +367,11 @@ static void kvm_s390_cpu_feat_init(void)
>>   
>>   	if (MACHINE_HAS_ESOP)
>>   		allow_cpu_feat(KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_ESOP);
>> +
>> +	/* Check if AP instructions installed on host */
>> +	if (ap_instructions_available())
>> +		allow_cpu_feat(KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_AP);
>> +
>>   	/*
>>   	 * We need SIE support, ESOP (PROT_READ protection for gmap_shadow),
>>   	 * 64bit SCAO (SCA passthrough) and IDTE (for gmap_shadow unshadowing).
>> diff --git a/arch/s390/tools/gen_facilities.c b/arch/s390/tools/gen_facilities.c
>> index 90a8c9e..a52290b 100644
>> --- a/arch/s390/tools/gen_facilities.c
>> +++ b/arch/s390/tools/gen_facilities.c
>> @@ -106,6 +106,8 @@ struct facility_def {
>>   
>>   		.name = "FACILITIES_KVM_CPUMODEL",
>>   		.bits = (int[]){
>> +			12, /* AP Query Configuration Information */
>> +			15, /* AP Facilities Test */
>>   			-1  /* END */
>>   		}
>>   	},
>>
> I really wonder if we should also export the APXA facility.

Given this comment is made within the context of the
FACILITIES_KVM_CPUMODEL I might point out that APXA is not
indicated by a facilities bit. It is indicated by a bit in
the QCI control block returned from the PQAP(QCI)
instruction to indicate that APXA is installed on all CPUs.

> We can probe and allow that CPU feature. However, we cannot disable it
> (as of now).

Given this patch series implements passthrough devices,
the output of the PQAP(QCI) will always be from a real
device - i.e., there will be no way to disable it.

>
> We have other CPU features where it is the same case (basically all
> subfunctions). See kvm_s390_get_processor_subfunc(). We probe them and
> export them, but support to disable them has never been implemented.
>
> On a high level, we could then e.g. deny to start a QEMU guest if APXA
> is available but has been disabled. (until we know that disabling it
> actually works - if ever).
>
> This helps to catch nasty migration bugs (e.g. APXA suddenly
> disappearing). Although unlikely, definitely possible.

Migration of AP devices is not supported by this patch series, so this 
should
not be an issue.

>
>
> Are there any other AP related facilities that the guest can from now on
> probe that should also become part of the CPU model?
>

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ