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Message-Id: <20180824224117.3356-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2018 15:41:12 -0700
From: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
casey.schaufler@...el.com, dave.hansen@...el.com,
deneen.t.dock@...el.com, kristen@...ux.intel.com,
arjan@...ux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v4 0/5] LSM: Add and use a hook for side-channel safety checks
v4: select namespace checks if user namespaces are enabled
and credential checks are request.
v3: get_task_cred wasn't a good choice due to refcounts.
Use lower level protection instead
v2: SELinux access policy corrected.
Use real_cred instead of cred.
This patchset provide a mechanism by which a security module
can advise the system about potential side-channel vulnerabilities.
If security_safe_sidechannel() returns 0 the security modules do
not know of any data that would be subject to a side-channel
attack. If the security module maintains data that it believes
may be susceptible to a side-channel attack it will return -EACCES.
Simple hooks are provided for SELinux and Smack. A new security
module is provided to make determinations regarding traditional
task attributes, including user IDs, capability sets and namespaces.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>
---
MAINTAINERS | 6 ++
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 12 ++-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 +++
include/linux/security.h | 1 +
security/Kconfig | 1 +
security/Makefile | 2 +
security/security.c | 6 ++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 ++
security/sidechannel/Kconfig | 65 +++++++++++++
security/sidechannel/Makefile | 1 +
security/sidechannel/sidechannel.c | 184 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 18 ++++
12 files changed, 313 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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