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Message-ID: <20180826061534.GT6515@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Date: Sun, 26 Aug 2018 07:15:43 +0100
From: Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@...atatu.com>,
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>,
Jiri Pirko <jiri@...nulli.us>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: sched: Fix memory exposure from short TCA_U32_SEL
On Sat, Aug 25, 2018 at 10:58:01PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Via u32_change(), TCA_U32_SEL has an unspecified type in the netlink
> policy, so max length isn't enforced, only minimum. This means nkeys
> (from userspace) was being trusted without checking the actual size of
> nla_len(), which could lead to a memory over-read, and ultimately an
> exposure via a call to u32_dump(). Reachability is CAP_NET_ADMIN within
> a namespace.
>
> Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
> Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@...atatu.com>
> Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>
> Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@...nulli.us>
> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
> Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> ---
> This should go through -stable please, but I have left off the "Cc:
> stable" as per netdev patch policy. Note that use of struct_size()
> will need manual expansion in backports, such as:
> sel_size = sizeof(*s) + sizeof(*s->keys) * s->nkeys;
Saner approach would be sel_size = offsetof(struct tc_u32_sel, keys[s->nkeys])...
> + sel_size = struct_size(s, keys, s->nkeys);
> + if (nla_len(tb[TCA_U32_SEL]) < sel_size) {
> + err = -EINVAL;
> + goto erridr;
> + }
>
> - n = kzalloc(sizeof(*n) + s->nkeys*sizeof(struct tc_u32_key), GFP_KERNEL);
> + n = kzalloc(offsetof(typeof(*n), sel) + sel_size, GFP_KERNEL);
ITYM
n = kzalloc(offsetof(struct tc_u_common, sel.keys[s->nkeys]), GFP_KERNEL);
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