linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 11/13] proc: readdir /proc/*/task

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Date:   Tue, 28 Aug 2018 13:04:40 +0000
From:   "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@...il.com>
To:     Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
Cc:     akpm@...ux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 11/13] proc: readdir /proc/*/task

On Tue, Aug 28, 2018 at 12:36:22PM +0000, Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 28, 2018 at 02:15:01AM +0300, Alexey Dobriyan wrote:
> > ---
> >  fs/proc/base.c | 8 ++++----
> >  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> 
> Missing description and S-o-b. Further comments below..
> 
> > diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> > index 33f444721965..668e465c86b3 100644
> > --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> > +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> > @@ -3549,11 +3549,11 @@ static int proc_task_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
> >  	for (task = first_tid(proc_pid(inode), tid, ctx->pos - 2, ns);
> >  	     task;
> >  	     task = next_tid(task), ctx->pos++) {
> > -		char name[10 + 1];
> > -		unsigned int len;
> > +		char name[10], *p = name + sizeof(name);
> > +
> 
> Multiple issues:
> 
> - len should be 11, as was in the original code
>   (0xffffffff = 4294967295, 10 letters)
> 
> - while we're at it, let's use a constant for the '11' instead of
>   mysterious magic numbers
> 
> - 'p' is clearly overflowing the stack here
>

See below:

> >  		tid = task_pid_nr_ns(task, ns);
> > -		len = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%u", tid);
> > -		if (!proc_fill_cache(file, ctx, name, len,
> > +		p = _print_integer_u32(p, tid);
> > +		if (!proc_fill_cache(file, ctx, p, name + sizeof(name) - p,
> 
> You're replacing snprintf() code __that did proper len checking__
> with code that does not. That's not good.
> 
> I can't see how the fourth proc_fill_cache() parameter, ``name +
> sizeof(name)'' safely ever replace the original 'len' parameter.
> It's a pointer value .. (!)
>

Ok, there's a "- p" in the end, so the length looks to be Ok.

Nonetheless, the whole patch series is introducing funny code
like:

+/*
+ * Print an integer in decimal.
+ * "p" initially points PAST THE END OF THE BUFFER!
+ *
+ * DO NOT USE THESE FUNCTIONS!
+ *
+ * Do not copy these functions.
+ * Do not document these functions.
+ * Do not move these functions to lib/ or elsewhere.
+ * Do not export these functions to modules.
+ * Do not tell anyone about these functions.
+ */
+noinline
+char *_print_integer_u32(char *p, u32 x)
+{
+       do {
+               *--p = '0' + (x % 10);
+               x /= 10;
+       } while (x != 0);
+       return p;
+}

And thus the code using these functions is throwing invalid
past-the-stack pointers and strings with no NULL terminators
like there's no tomorrow...

IMHO It's an accident waiting to happen to sprinkle pointers
like that everywhere. Are we really in a super hot path to
justify all that?

/me confused

-- 
Darwish
http://darwish.chasingpointers.com