[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20180828154901.112726-1-jannh@google.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Aug 2018 17:49:01 +0200
From: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, x86@...nel.org, jannh@...gle.com
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
security@...nel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2] x86/dumpstack: don't dump kernel memory based on usermode RIP
show_opcodes() is used both for dumping kernel instructions and for dumping
user instructions. If userspace causes #PF by jumping to a kernel address,
show_opcodes() can be reached with regs->ip controlled by the user,
pointing to kernel code. Make sure that userspace can't trick us into
dumping kernel memory into dmesg.
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Fixes: 7cccf0725cf7 ("x86/dumpstack: Add a show_ip() function")
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
---
v2: Andy pointed out that I probably shouldn't be doing wrapping
arithmetic on pointers.
arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 13 ++++++++++---
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h
index b6dc698f992a..f335aad404a4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h
@@ -111,6 +111,6 @@ static inline unsigned long caller_frame_pointer(void)
return (unsigned long)frame;
}
-void show_opcodes(u8 *rip, const char *loglvl);
+void show_opcodes(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *loglvl);
void show_ip(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *loglvl);
#endif /* _ASM_X86_STACKTRACE_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
index 9c8652974f8e..14b337582b6f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
@@ -89,14 +89,21 @@ static void printk_stack_address(unsigned long address, int reliable,
* Thus, the 2/3rds prologue and 64 byte OPCODE_BUFSIZE is just a random
* guesstimate in attempt to achieve all of the above.
*/
-void show_opcodes(u8 *rip, const char *loglvl)
+void show_opcodes(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *loglvl)
{
#define PROLOGUE_SIZE 42
#define EPILOGUE_SIZE 21
#define OPCODE_BUFSIZE (PROLOGUE_SIZE + 1 + EPILOGUE_SIZE)
u8 opcodes[OPCODE_BUFSIZE];
+ u8 *prologue = (u8 *)(regs->ip - PROLOGUE_SIZE);
+ /*
+ * Make sure userspace isn't trying to trick us into dumping kernel
+ * memory by pointing the userspace instruction pointer at it.
+ */
+ bool bad_ip = user_mode(regs) &&
+ __range_not_ok(prologue, OPCODE_BUFSIZE, TASK_SIZE_MAX);
- if (probe_kernel_read(opcodes, rip - PROLOGUE_SIZE, OPCODE_BUFSIZE)) {
+ if (bad_ip || probe_kernel_read(opcodes, prologue, OPCODE_BUFSIZE)) {
printk("%sCode: Bad RIP value.\n", loglvl);
} else {
printk("%sCode: %" __stringify(PROLOGUE_SIZE) "ph <%02x> %"
@@ -112,7 +119,7 @@ void show_ip(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *loglvl)
#else
printk("%sRIP: %04x:%pS\n", loglvl, (int)regs->cs, (void *)regs->ip);
#endif
- show_opcodes((u8 *)regs->ip, loglvl);
+ show_opcodes(regs, loglvl);
}
void show_iret_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index b9123c497e0a..47bebfe6efa7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ show_signal_msg(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
printk(KERN_CONT "\n");
- show_opcodes((u8 *)regs->ip, loglvl);
+ show_opcodes(regs, loglvl);
}
static void
--
2.19.0.rc0.228.g281dcd1b4d0-goog
Powered by blists - more mailing lists