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Message-ID: <004057f1-f0cd-5410-e4e3-a17287613f89@android.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Aug 2018 11:51:55 -0700
From: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@...roid.com>
To: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@...il.com>
Cc: linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
overlayfs <linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/3] overlayfs: check CAP_MKNOD before issuing
vfs_whiteout
On 08/28/2018 11:42 AM, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 28, 2018 at 8:43 PM Amir Goldstein <amir73il@...il.com> wrote:
>> On Tue, Aug 28, 2018 at 7:53 PM Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@...roid.com> wrote:
>>> Assumption never checked, should fail if the mounter creds are not
>>> sufficient.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@...roid.com>
>>> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>
>>> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
>>> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
>>> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
>>> Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@...il.com>
>>> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>
>>> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
>>> Cc: linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org
>>> Cc: linux-doc@...r.kernel.org
>>> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
>>>
>>> v5
>>> - dependency of "overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred"
>>> ---
>>> fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 2 +-
>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
>>> index 7538b9b56237..bf3a80157d42 100644
>>> --- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
>>> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
>>> @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static inline int ovl_do_rename(struct inode *olddir, struct dentry *olddentry,
>>>
>>> static inline int ovl_do_whiteout(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
>>> {
>>> - int err = vfs_whiteout(dir, dentry);
>>> + int err = capable(CAP_MKNOD) ? vfs_whiteout(dir, dentry) : -EPERM;
>> Should that be ns_capable()? Should the test go into vfs_whiteout()?
>> I feel there is no convention at all.
>>
> Nevermind, I don't think creating a whiteout poses any risk, so don't think
> we need to worry about CAP_MKNOD.
>
> Thanks,
> Amir.
Ok, will discard from the set, we can address this later if it creates
concern (as in, not a dependency to my proposed feature flag). So we
feel that whiteout node in the writeable playground of workdir/upperdir
is not in itself a security concern. Other (more dangerous) mknod will
be checked against the caller's credentials coming in.
-- Mark
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