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Message-ID: <16738629-2574-69b6-1ce6-0d37fbb18a9c@amd.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2018 09:37:46 -0500
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Cc: brijesh.singh@....com, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] x86/mm: add .data..decrypted section to hold
shared variables
On 08/29/2018 08:59 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 28, 2018 at 05:12:56PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> kvmclock defines few static variables which are shared with hypervisor
>
> ... with the hypervisor ...
>
>> during the kvmclock initialization.
>>
>> When SEV is active, memory is encrypted with a guest-specific key, and
>> if guest OS wants to share the memory region with hypervisor then it must
>> clear the C-bit before sharing it. Currently, we use
>> kernel_physical_mapping_init() to split large pages before clearing the
>> C-bit on shared pages. But the kernel_physical_mapping_init fails when
>
> "But it fails when..."
>
>> called from the kvmclock initialization (mainly because memblock allocator
>> was not ready).
>
> "... is not ready that early during boot)."
>
>> The '__decrypted' can be used to define a shared variable; the variables
>
> "Add a __decrypted section attribute which can be used when defining
> such shared variable. The so-defined variables will be placed..."
>
>> will be put in the .data.decryption section. This section is mapped with
>
> " ... in the .data..decrypted section."
>
>> C=0 early in the boot, we also ensure that the initialized values are
>
> "... early during boot,"
>
>> updated to match with C=0 (i.e perform an in-place decryption). The
>> .data..decrypted section is PMD aligned and sized so that we avoid the
>
> "... PMD-aligned ..."
>
>> need to split the large pages when mapping this section.
>>
>> The sme_encrypt_kernel() was used to perform the in-place encryption
>> of the Linux kernel and initrd when SME is active. The routine has been
>> enhanced to decrypt the .data..decryption section for both SME and SEV
>> cases.
>
> ".data..decrypted"
>
>>
>> While reusing the sme_populate_pgd() we found that the function does not
>> update the flags if the pte/pmd entry already exists. The patch updates
>> the function to take care of it.
>
>
> Change the tone to impartial:
>
> "While at it, fix sme_populate_pgd() to update page flags if the PMD/PTE
> entry already exists."
>
> And avoid using "This patch" - what this patch does, should be visible
> to the enlightened onlooker.
>
Thanks Boris, I will incorporate your edits in commit message.
>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
>> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
>> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
>> Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org
>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
>> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
>> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
>> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
>> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
>> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
>> Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org
>> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 6 +++
>> arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 9 ++++
>> arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 17 +++++++
>> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>> 4 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
>> index c064383..802b2eb 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
>> @@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
>> bool sme_active(void);
>> bool sev_active(void);
>>
>> +#define __decrypted __attribute__((__section__(".data..decrypted")))
>> +
>> #else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
>>
>> #define sme_me_mask 0ULL
>> @@ -77,6 +79,8 @@ early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0;
>> static inline int __init
>> early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; }
>>
>> +#define __decrypted
>> +
>> #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
>>
>> /*
>> @@ -88,6 +92,8 @@ early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0;
>> #define __sme_pa(x) (__pa(x) | sme_me_mask)
>> #define __sme_pa_nodebug(x) (__pa_nodebug(x) | sme_me_mask)
>>
>> +extern char __start_data_decrypted[], __end_data_decrypted[];
>> +
>> #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
>>
>> #endif /* __X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_H__ */
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> index 8047379..3e03129 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ static bool __head check_la57_support(unsigned long physaddr)
>> unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr,
>> struct boot_params *bp)
>> {
>> + unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end;
>> unsigned long load_delta, *p;
>> unsigned long pgtable_flags;
>> pgdval_t *pgd;
>> @@ -234,6 +235,14 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr,
>> /* Encrypt the kernel and related (if SME is active) */
>> sme_encrypt_kernel(bp);
>>
>> + /* Clear the memory encryption mask from the decrypted section */
>
> End sentences with a fullstop.
Noted.
>
>> + vaddr = (unsigned long)__start_data_decrypted;
>> + vaddr_end = (unsigned long)__end_data_decrypted;
>> + for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr += PMD_SIZE) {
>> + i = pmd_index(vaddr);
>> + pmd[i] -= sme_get_me_mask();
>> + }
>
> This needs to be no-op on !SME machines. Hint: if (sme_active())...
Sure, I will add the check before calling this loop.
>
>> /*
>> * Return the SME encryption mask (if SME is active) to be used as a
>> * modifier for the initial pgdir entry programmed into CR3.
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
>> index 8bde0a4..0ef9320 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
>> @@ -89,6 +89,21 @@ PHDRS {
>> note PT_NOTE FLAGS(0); /* ___ */
>> }
>>
>> +/*
>> + * This section contains data which will be mapped as decrypted. Memory
>> + * encryption operates on a page basis. But we make this section a pmd
>
> "... make this section PMD-aligned ..."
>
> Also, avoid the "we" and formulate in passive voic
Noted.
>
>> + * aligned to avoid spliting the pages while mapping the section early.
>> + *
>> + * Note: We use a separate section so that only this section gets
>> + * decrypted to avoid exposing more than we wish.
>> + */
>> +#define DATA_DECRYPTED_SECTION \
>
> DATA_DECRYPTED is perfectly fine.
Noted.
>
>> + . = ALIGN(PMD_SIZE); \
>> + __start_data_decrypted = .; \
>> + *(.data..decrypted); \
>> + . = ALIGN(PMD_SIZE); \
>> + __end_data_decrypted = .; \
>> +
>> SECTIONS
>> {
>> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
>> @@ -171,6 +186,8 @@ SECTIONS
>> /* rarely changed data like cpu maps */
>> READ_MOSTLY_DATA(INTERNODE_CACHE_BYTES)
>>
>> + DATA_DECRYPTED_SECTION
>> +
>> /* End of data section */
>> _edata = .;
>> } :data
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
>> index bf6097e..88c1cce 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
>> @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
>> (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT))
>>
>> #define PMD_FLAGS_ENC (PMD_FLAGS_LARGE | _PAGE_ENC)
>> +#define PMD_FLAGS_ENC_WP ((PMD_FLAGS_ENC & ~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK) | \
>> + (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT))
>>
>> #define PTE_FLAGS (__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL)
>>
>> @@ -59,6 +61,8 @@
>> (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT))
>>
>> #define PTE_FLAGS_ENC (PTE_FLAGS | _PAGE_ENC)
>> +#define PTE_FLAGS_ENC_WP ((PTE_FLAGS_ENC & ~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK) | \
>> + (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT))
>>
>> struct sme_populate_pgd_data {
>> void *pgtable_area;
>> @@ -154,9 +158,6 @@ static void __init sme_populate_pgd_large(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
>> return;
>>
>> pmd = pmd_offset(pud, ppd->vaddr);
>> - if (pmd_large(*pmd))
>> - return;
>> -
>> set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(ppd->paddr | ppd->pmd_flags));
>> }
>>
>> @@ -182,8 +183,7 @@ static void __init sme_populate_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
>> return;
>>
>> pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, ppd->vaddr);
>> - if (pte_none(*pte))
>> - set_pte(pte, __pte(ppd->paddr | ppd->pte_flags));
>> + set_pte(pte, __pte(ppd->paddr | ppd->pte_flags));
>> }
>>
>
> This looks like it belongs in a prepatch fix.
Sure, I can do a prepatch for this change.
>
>> static void __init __sme_map_range_pmd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
>> @@ -235,6 +235,11 @@ static void __init sme_map_range_encrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
>> __sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_ENC, PTE_FLAGS_ENC);
>> }
>>
>> +static void __init sme_map_range_encrypted_wp(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
>> +{
>> + __sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_ENC_WP, PTE_FLAGS_ENC_WP);
>> +}
>> +
>> static void __init sme_map_range_decrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
>> {
>> __sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_DEC, PTE_FLAGS_DEC);
>
> These changes with the _WP flags and helper addition belong in a pre-patch.
>
>> @@ -382,7 +387,10 @@ static void __init build_workarea_map(struct boot_params *bp,
>> ppd->paddr = workarea_start;
>> ppd->vaddr = workarea_start;
>> ppd->vaddr_end = workarea_end;
>> - sme_map_range_decrypted(ppd);
>> + if (sev_active())
>> + sme_map_range_encrypted(ppd);
>> + else
>> + sme_map_range_decrypted(ppd);
>>
>> /* Flush the TLB - no globals so cr3 is enough */
>> native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
>> @@ -439,16 +447,27 @@ static void __init build_workarea_map(struct boot_params *bp,
>> sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(ppd);
>> }
>>
>> - /* Add decrypted workarea mappings to both kernel mappings */
>> + /*
>> + * When SEV is active, kernel is already encrypted hence mapping
>> + * the initial workarea_start as encrypted. When SME is active,
>> + * the kernel is not encrypted hence add a decrypted workarea
>
> s/ a//
Noted.
>
>> + * mappings to both kernel mappings.
>> + */
>> ppd->paddr = workarea_start;
>> ppd->vaddr = workarea_start;
>> ppd->vaddr_end = workarea_end;
>> - sme_map_range_decrypted(ppd);
>> + if (sev_active())
>> + sme_map_range_encrypted(ppd);
>> + else
>> + sme_map_range_decrypted(ppd);
>>
>> ppd->paddr = workarea_start;
>> ppd->vaddr = workarea_start + decrypted_base;
>> ppd->vaddr_end = workarea_end + decrypted_base;
>> - sme_map_range_decrypted(ppd);
>> + if (sev_active())
>> + sme_map_range_encrypted(ppd);
>> + else
>> + sme_map_range_decrypted(ppd);
>>
>> wa->kernel_start = kernel_start;
>> wa->kernel_end = kernel_end;
>> @@ -491,28 +510,69 @@ static void __init remove_workarea_map(struct sme_workarea_data *wa,
>> native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
>> }
>>
>> +static void __init decrypt_data_decrypted_section(struct sme_workarea_data *wa,
>
> That function name could use some clarifying change...
How about decrypt_shared_data() ?
>
>> + struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
>> +{
>> + unsigned long decrypted_start, decrypted_end, decrypted_len;
>> +
>> + /* Physical addresses of decrypted data section */
>> + decrypted_start = __pa_symbol(__start_data_decrypted);
>> + decrypted_end = ALIGN(__pa_symbol(__end_data_decrypted), PMD_PAGE_SIZE);
>> + decrypted_len = decrypted_end - decrypted_start;
>> +
>> + if (!decrypted_len)
>> + return;
>> +
>> + /* Add decrypted mapping for the section (identity) */
>> + ppd->paddr = decrypted_start;
>> + ppd->vaddr = decrypted_start;
>> + ppd->vaddr_end = decrypted_end;
>> + sme_map_range_decrypted(ppd);
>> +
>> + /* Add encrypted-wp mapping for the section (non-identity) */
>> + ppd->paddr = decrypted_start;
>> + ppd->vaddr = decrypted_start + wa->decrypted_base;
>> + ppd->vaddr_end = decrypted_end + wa->decrypted_base;
>> + sme_map_range_encrypted_wp(ppd);
>> +
>> + /* Perform in-place decryption */
>> + sme_encrypt_execute(decrypted_start,
>> + decrypted_start + wa->decrypted_base,
>> + decrypted_len, wa->workarea_start,
>> + (unsigned long)ppd->pgd);
>> +
>> + ppd->vaddr = decrypted_start + wa->decrypted_base;
>> + ppd->vaddr_end = decrypted_end + wa->decrypted_base;
>> + sme_clear_pgd(ppd);
>> +}
>> +
>> void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
>> {
>> struct sme_populate_pgd_data ppd;
>> struct sme_workarea_data wa;
>>
>> - if (!sme_active())
>> + if (!mem_encrypt_active())
>> return;
>>
>> build_workarea_map(bp, &wa, &ppd);
>>
>> - /* When SEV is active, encrypt kernel and initrd */
>> - sme_encrypt_execute(wa.kernel_start,
>> - wa.kernel_start + wa.decrypted_base,
>> - wa.kernel_len, wa.workarea_start,
>> - (unsigned long)ppd.pgd);
>> -
>> - if (wa.initrd_len)
>> - sme_encrypt_execute(wa.initrd_start,
>> - wa.initrd_start + wa.decrypted_base,
>> - wa.initrd_len, wa.workarea_start,
>> + /* When SME is active, encrypt kernel and initrd */
>> + if (sme_active()) {
>> + sme_encrypt_execute(wa.kernel_start,
>> + wa.kernel_start + wa.decrypted_base,
>> + wa.kernel_len, wa.workarea_start,
>> (unsigned long)ppd.pgd);
>>
>> + if (wa.initrd_len)
>> + sme_encrypt_execute(wa.initrd_start,
>> + wa.initrd_start + wa.decrypted_base,
>> + wa.initrd_len, wa.workarea_start,
>> + (unsigned long)ppd.pgd);
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Decrypt the contents of .data..decrypted section */
>> + decrypt_data_decrypted_section(&wa, &ppd);
>> +
>> remove_workarea_map(&wa, &ppd);
>> }
>>
>> --
>> 2.7.4
>>
>
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