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Message-Id: <20180903165721.208980846@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon,  3 Sep 2018 18:56:25 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Wen Xu <wen.xu@...ech.edu>,
        Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>
Subject: [PATCH 4.18 041/123] ext4: check for NUL characters in extended attributes name

4.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>

commit 7d95178c77014dbd8dce36ee40bbbc5e6c121ff5 upstream.

Extended attribute names are defined to be NUL-terminated, so the name
must not contain a NUL character.  This is important because there are
places when remove extended attribute, the code uses strlen to
determine the length of the entry.  That should probably be fixed at
some point, but code is currently really messy, so the simplest fix
for now is to simply validate that the extended attributes are sane.

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200401

Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@...ech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ext4/xattr.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
@@ -190,6 +190,8 @@ ext4_xattr_check_entries(struct ext4_xat
 		struct ext4_xattr_entry *next = EXT4_XATTR_NEXT(e);
 		if ((void *)next >= end)
 			return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+		if (strnlen(e->e_name, e->e_name_len) != e->e_name_len)
+			return -EFSCORRUPTED;
 		e = next;
 	}
 


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