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Message-Id: <20180903165723.015422659@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon,  3 Sep 2018 18:57:06 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, x86@...nel.org
Subject: [PATCH 4.18 082/123] x86/spectre: Add missing family 6 check to microcode check

4.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>

commit 1ab534e85c93945f7862378d8c8adcf408205b19 upstream.

The check for Spectre microcodes does not check for family 6, only the
model numbers.

Add a family 6 check to avoid ambiguity with other families.

Fixes: a5b296636453 ("x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes")
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: x86@...nel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180824170351.34874-2-andi@firstfloor.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -150,6 +150,9 @@ static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
 		return false;
 
+	if (c->x86 != 6)
+		return false;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spectre_bad_microcodes); i++) {
 		if (c->x86_model == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].model &&
 		    c->x86_stepping == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].stepping)


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