linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.14 031/165] KVM: vmx: use local variable for current

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Message-Id: <20180903165656.655632955@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon,  3 Sep 2018 18:55:17 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Peter Shier <pshier@...gle.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@...rosoft.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 031/165] KVM: vmx: use local variable for current_vmptr when emulating VMPTRST

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>

[ Upstream commit 0a06d4256674c4e041945b52044941995fee237d ]

Do not expose the address of vmx->nested.current_vmptr to
kvm_write_guest_virt_system() as the resulting __copy_to_user()
call will trigger a WARN when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is
enabled.

Opportunistically clean up variable names in handle_vmptrst()
to improve readability, e.g. vmcs_gva is misleading as the
memory operand of VMPTRST is plain memory, not a VMCS.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Tested-by: Peter Shier <pshier@...gle.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@...rosoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c |   15 +++++++--------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -8108,21 +8108,20 @@ static int handle_vmptrld(struct kvm_vcp
 /* Emulate the VMPTRST instruction */
 static int handle_vmptrst(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
-	u32 vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
-	gva_t vmcs_gva;
+	unsigned long exit_qual = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+	u32 instr_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
+	gpa_t current_vmptr = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.current_vmptr;
 	struct x86_exception e;
+	gva_t gva;
 
 	if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
 		return 1;
 
-	if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, exit_qualification,
-			vmx_instruction_info, true, &vmcs_gva))
+	if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, exit_qual, instr_info, true, &gva))
 		return 1;
 	/* *_system ok, nested_vmx_check_permission has verified cpl=0 */
-	if (kvm_write_guest_virt_system(vcpu, vmcs_gva,
-					(void *)&to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.current_vmptr,
-					sizeof(u64), &e)) {
+	if (kvm_write_guest_virt_system(vcpu, gva, (void *)&current_vmptr,
+					sizeof(gpa_t), &e)) {
 		kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &e);
 		return 1;
 	}