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Message-ID: <20180905155823.GL27886@tassilo.jf.intel.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Sep 2018 08:58:23 -0700
From: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
"Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] ptrace: Provide ___ptrace_may_access() that can
be applied on arbitrary tasks
> So, after giving it a bit more thought, I still believe "I want spectre V2
> protection" vs. "I do not care about spectre V2 on my system
> (=nospectre_v2)" are the sane options we should provide; so I'll respin v4
> of my patchset, including the ptrace check in switch_mm() (statically
> patched out on !IBPB-capable systems), and we can then later see whether
> the LSM implementation, once it exists, should be used instead.
Please if you repost include plenty of performance numbers for multi threaded
workloads. It's ridiculous to even discuss this without them.
-Andi
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