linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 2/2] crypto: skcipher: Remove VLA usage for SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON

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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKg2GTPxo=N2xLoxbLM3LQHhE+TButPJQeP-Ze1zqEs_w@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 6 Sep 2018 12:18:28 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>
Cc:     Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@...yossef.com>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
        Antoine Tenart <antoine.tenart@...tlin.com>,
        Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@...tlin.com>,
        Arnaud Ebalard <arno@...isbad.org>,
        Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@...il.com>,
        Maxime Ripard <maxime.ripard@...tlin.com>,
        Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@...e.org>,
        Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@...il.com>,
        Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@...b.com>,
        Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@...wei.com>,
        "open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE" 
        <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] crypto: skcipher: Remove VLA usage for SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK

On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 7:49 AM, Ard Biesheuvel
<ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org> wrote:
> On 6 September 2018 at 15:11, Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au> wrote:
>> On Thu, Sep 06, 2018 at 11:29:41AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>>>
>>> Perhaps not, but it is not enforced atm.
>>>
>>> In any case, limiting the reqsize is going to break things, so that
>>> needs to occur based on the sync/async nature of the algo. That also
>>> means we'll corrupt the stack if we ever end up using
>>> SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() with an async algo whose reqsize is
>>> greater than the sync reqsize limit, so I do think some additional
>>> sanity check is appropriate.
>>
>> I'd prefer compile-time based checks.  Perhaps we can introduce
>> a wrapper around crypto_skcipher, say crypto_skcipher_sync which
>> could then be used by SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK to ensure that
>> only sync algorithms can use this construct.
>>
>
> That would require lots of changes in the callers, including ones that
> already take care to use sync algos only.
>
> How about we do something like the below instead?

Oh, I like this, thanks!

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security