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Message-Id: <10030BE1-FE29-4C60-9963-4BE932EF09BA@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2018 13:12:14 -0700
From: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: use WRITE_ONCE() when setting PTEs
at 12:57 PM, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org> wrote:
> On Sun, Sep 02, 2018 at 11:14:50AM -0700, Nadav Amit wrote:
>> When page-table entries are set, the compiler might optimize their
>> assignment by using multiple instructions to set the PTE. This might
>> turn into a security hazard if the user somehow manages to use the
>> interim PTE. L1TF does not make our lives easier, making even an interim
>> non-present PTE a security hazard.
>>
>> Using WRITE_ONCE() to set PTEs and friends should prevent this potential
>> security hazard.
>>
>> I skimmed the differences in the binary with and without this patch. The
>> differences are (obviously) greater when CONFIG_PARAVIRT=n as more
>> code optimizations are possible. For better and worse, the impact on the
>> binary with this patch is pretty small. Skimming the code did not cause
>> anything to jump out as a security hazard, but it seems that at least
>> move_soft_dirty_pte() caused set_pte_at() to use multiple writes.
>
> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
>
> Also, its corollary would also make sense/be required, use READ_ONCE()
> when reading these.
I don’t know. This would obviously be much more intrusive. I can add a
get_pte() and write a Coccinelle script to use it instead of reading the
PTE, but in most cases, I presume, it would be an overkill.
The reason for that is that the PTEs are supposed to be accessed while
holding the page-table lock, and the hardware can only change dirty & access
bits. I think that any code that assumes that these bits do not change while
holding the lock is already broken in more ways.
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