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Message-ID: <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809102132480.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm>
Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2018 21:36:12 +0200 (CEST)
From: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>
To: "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>
cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
"Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v5 1/2] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to
avoid cross-process data leak
On Mon, 10 Sep 2018, Schaufler, Casey wrote:
> Yes, It would require that this patch be tested against all the existing
> security modules that provide a ptrace_access_check hook. It's not like
> the security module writers don't have a bunch of locking issues to deal
> with.
Yeah, that was indeed my concern.
So can we agree on doing this in the 2nd envisioned step, when this is
going to be replaced by LSM as discussed [1] previously?
[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/99FC4B6EFCEFD44486C35F4C281DC67321447094@ORSMSX107.amr.corp.intel.com
Thanks,
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
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