[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <0ee402c0-bd0e-ea84-9def-f6355b83b4f5@infradead.org>
Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2018 09:24:38 -0700
From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>
To: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@...il.com>,
"Rafael J . Wysocki" <rjw@...ysocki.net>,
Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-pm@...r.kernel.org,
"Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@...e.com>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>,
Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@...el.com>,
Oliver Neukum <oneukum@...e.com>,
Ryan Chen <yu.chen.surf@...il.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Giovanni Gherdovich <ggherdovich@...e.cz>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/5] PM / hibernate: An option to request that snapshot
image must be authenticated
Hi,
On 9/12/18 7:23 AM, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> diff --git a/kernel/power/Kconfig b/kernel/power/Kconfig
> index 7c5c30149dbc..3c998fd6dc4c 100644
> --- a/kernel/power/Kconfig
> +++ b/kernel/power/Kconfig
> @@ -90,6 +90,17 @@ config HIBERNATION_ENC_AUTH
> master key of hibernation. The TPM trusted key depends on TPM. The
> security of user defined key relies on user space.
>
> +config HIBERNATION_ENC_AUTH_FORCE
> + bool "Require hibernate snapshot image to be validly signed"
> + depends on HIBERNATION_ENC_AUTH
> + help
> + This option will prevent that a snapshot image without (valid)
> + signature be restored. Without this option, a unauthenticated
an
> + snapshot image can be restored but the restored kernel will be
> + tainted. Which also means that the hibernation can be triggered
s/Which/This/
or like this:
tainted, which also
> + without snapshot key but kernel will be tainted without this
> + option.
> +
--
~Randy
Powered by blists - more mailing lists