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Message-ID: <5a17beeb-c83c-ce8e-162c-1fbeb74aaae8@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2018 12:01:29 -0700
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
LKLM <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
SE Linux <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
"linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 04/10] LSM: Infrastructure management of the cred security
blob
On 9/12/2018 4:53 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 9:41 AM, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> Move management of the cred security blob out of the
>> security modules and into the security infrastructure.
>> Instead of allocating and freeing space the security
>> modules tell the infrastructure how much space they
>> require.
> There's a lot of changes here that I think deserve some longer
> discussion in the changelog. Notably, now we run _two_ cycles of init
> calls? That seems... odd. Notes below...
The first pass adds up the blob sizes. This has to be done because
some modules allocate blobs during the init phase. I have investigated
alternatives, including blobs that include information about what they
contain, but they're all significantly more complicated.
>> Some SELinux memory management debug code has been removed.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
>> ---
>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 14 ++++
>> kernel/cred.c | 13 ----
>> security/Kconfig | 11 ++++
>> security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +-
>> security/apparmor/include/cred.h | 16 ++++-
>> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 28 ++++++--
>> security/apparmor/task.c | 6 +-
>> security/security.c | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 63 +++++-------------
>> security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 4 ++
>> security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 1 +
>> security/smack/smack.h | 1 +
>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 85 +++++++++---------------
>> security/tomoyo/common.h | 21 +++++-
>> security/tomoyo/domain.c | 4 +-
>> security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c | 15 +++--
>> security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 56 +++++++++++++---
>> 17 files changed, 303 insertions(+), 143 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> index 97a020c616ad..0bef312efd45 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> @@ -2024,6 +2024,13 @@ struct security_hook_list {
>> char *lsm;
>> } __randomize_layout;
>>
>> +/*
>> + * Security blob size or offset data.
>> + */
>> +struct lsm_blob_sizes {
>> + int lbs_cred;
>> +};
>> +
>> /*
>> * Initializing a security_hook_list structure takes
>> * up a lot of space in a source file. This macro takes
>> @@ -2036,6 +2043,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
>> extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
>> extern char *lsm_names;
>>
>> +extern void security_add_blobs(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed);
>> extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>> char *lsm);
>>
>> @@ -2082,4 +2090,10 @@ void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void);
>> static inline void loadpin_add_hooks(void) { };
>> #endif
>>
>> +extern int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>> +void lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred);
>> +#endif
>> +
>> #endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
>> diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
>> index ecf03657e71c..fa2061ee4955 100644
>> --- a/kernel/cred.c
>> +++ b/kernel/cred.c
>> @@ -704,19 +704,6 @@ bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
>> {
>> if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
>> return true;
>> -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
>> - /*
>> - * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
>> - * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
>> - */
>> - if (selinux_is_enabled() && cred->security) {
>> - if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE)
>> - return true;
>> - if ((*(u32 *)cred->security & 0xffffff00) ==
>> - (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8))
>> - return true;
> These aren't unreasonable checks -- can we add them back in later?
> (They don't need to be selinux specific, in fact: the LSM could do the
> poison...)
I had asked the maintainers about the value of these checks, and
they said that they were primarily there for debugging during the
original cred breakout development. I'd have not problem making them
infrastructure managed if there's a strong desire to keep them.
>> [...]
>> diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
>> index 08c88de0ffda..726910bba84b 100644
>> --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
>> +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
>> @@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>> }
>> aa_put_label(cred_label(bprm->cred));
>> /* transfer reference, released when cred is freed */
>> - cred_label(bprm->cred) = new;
>> + set_cred_label(bprm->cred, new);
>>
>> done:
>> aa_put_label(label);
>> diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
>> index e287b7d0d4be..a90eae76d7c1 100644
>> --- a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
>> +++ b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
>> @@ -23,8 +23,22 @@
>> #include "policy_ns.h"
>> #include "task.h"
>>
>> -#define cred_label(X) ((X)->security)
>> +static inline struct aa_label *cred_label(const struct cred *cred)
>> +{
>> + struct aa_label **blob = cred->security;
>> +
>> + AA_BUG(!blob);
>> + return *blob;
>> +}
>>
>> +static inline void set_cred_label(const struct cred *cred,
>> + struct aa_label *label)
>> +{
>> + struct aa_label **blob = cred->security;
>> +
>> + AA_BUG(!blob);
>> + *blob = label;
>> +}
> This feels like it should be a separate patch? Shouldn't AA not be
> playing with cred->security directly before we get to this "sizing and
> allocation" patch?
You're correct. This is a harmless patch break-up mistake. The end
result of the set is correct, and the interim state works as intended,
albeit with unnecessary code.
>> [...]
>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>> index 3dfe75d0d373..ff7df14f6db1 100644
>> --- a/security/security.c
>> +++ b/security/security.c
>> @@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
>> static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(lsm_notifier_chain);
>>
>> char *lsm_names;
>> +static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes;
> This needs to be __lsm_ro_after_init.
Point.
>> +
>> /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
>> static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
>> CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
>> @@ -85,10 +87,22 @@ int __init security_init(void)
>> loadpin_add_hooks();
>>
>> /*
>> - * Load all the remaining security modules.
>> + * The first call to a module specific init function
>> + * updates the blob size requirements.
>> + */
>> + do_security_initcalls();
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * The second call to a module specific init function
>> + * adds hooks to the hook lists and does any other early
>> + * initializations required.
>> */
>> do_security_initcalls();
> Tracking init state internally to each LSM seems not great. What about
> having the state be a global the LSMs can query?
It looks like six of one, half dozen of the other to me.
I don't feel strongly either way. I did it the way I did
because it was easy. If you feel strongly I can certainly
change it.
>
> enum security_initcall_state_t {
> LSM_PRE_INIT,
> LSM_INIT,
> };
>
> static __initdata enum security_initcall_state_t security_initcall_state;
>
> static void __init __do_security_initcalls(enum security_initcall_state state)
> {
> int ret;
> initcall_t call;
> initcall_entry_t *ce;
>
> security_initcall_state = state;
>
> ce = __security_initcall_start;
> trace_initcall_level("security");
> while (ce < __security_initcall_end) {
> call = initcall_from_entry(ce);
> trace_initcall_start(call);
> ret = call();
> trace_initcall_finish(call, ret);
> ce++;
> }
> }
>
> static void __init do_security_initcalls(void)
> {
> __do_security_initcalls(LSM_PRE_INIT);
> __do_security_initcalls(LSM_INIT);
> }
>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG
>> + pr_info("LSM: cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
>> +#endif
>> +
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> @@ -198,6 +212,73 @@ int unregister_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
>> }
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_lsm_notifier);
>>
>> +/**
>> + * lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob
>> + * @cred: the cred that needs a blob
>> + * @gfp: allocation type
>> + *
>> + * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules
>> + *
>> + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
>> + */
>> +int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
>> +{
>> + if (blob_sizes.lbs_cred == 0) {
>> + cred->security = NULL;
>> + return 0;
>> + }
>> +
>> + cred->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp);
>> + if (cred->security == NULL)
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob
>> + * @cred: the cred that needs a blob
>> + *
>> + * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules if it's not already there
> Perhaps mention this is mainly for retroactively attaching a cred blob
> to "init"?
Strictly, in fact.
>> + */
>> +void lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred)
>> +{
>> + int rc;
>> +
>> + if (cred == NULL)
>> + panic("%s: NULL cred.\n", __func__);
> I have been given strongly worded advice to never BUG nor panic. I would:
>
> if (WARN_ON(!cred || !cred->security))
> return;
>
>> + if (cred->security != NULL)
>> + return;
>> + rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (rc)
>> + panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__);
> And:
>
> WARN_ON(lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL));
This duplicates the previous behavior from the SELinux and Smack code.
A WARN_ON will result in an immediate panic when the calling code tries
to dereference the blob.
>
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void __init lsm_set_size(int *need, int *lbs)
>> +{
>> + int offset;
>> +
>> + if (*need > 0) {
>> + offset = *lbs;
>> + *lbs += *need;
>> + *need = offset;
>> + }
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * security_add_blobs - Report blob sizes
>> + * @needed: the size of blobs needed by the module
>> + *
>> + * Each LSM has to register its blobs with the infrastructure.
>> + * The "needed" data tells the infrastructure how much memory
>> + * the module requires for each of its blobs. On return the
>> + * structure is filled with the offset that module should use
>> + * from the blob pointer.
>> + */
>> +void __init security_add_blobs(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
>> +{
>> + lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
>> +}
>> +
>> /*
>> * Hook list operation macros.
>> *
>> @@ -998,17 +1079,36 @@ void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
>>
>> int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
>> {
>> - return call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp);
>> + int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp);
>> +
>> + if (rc)
>> + return rc;
>> +
>> + rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp);
>> + if (rc)
>> + security_cred_free(cred);
>> + return rc;
> I spent some time looking at this, but I think this is fine. I thought
> it might be a double-free via the put_cred_rcu() path, but
> cred->security gets set to NULL below, and we really don't want
> allocated memory hanging around in the call_int_hook fails, so ...
> yes. All good.
>
>> }
>>
>> void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
>> {
>> call_void_hook(cred_free, cred);
>> +
>> + kfree(cred->security);
>> + cred->security = NULL;
>> }
>>
>> int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
>> {
>> - return call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
>> + int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp);
>> +
>> + if (rc)
>> + return rc;
>> +
>> + rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
>> + if (rc)
>> + security_cred_free(new);
>> + return rc;
>> }
>>
>> void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> index 9d6cdd21acb6..9b49698754a7 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> @@ -213,12 +213,9 @@ static void cred_init_security(void)
>> struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
>> struct task_security_struct *tsec;
>>
>> - tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
>> - if (!tsec)
>> - panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
>> -
>> + lsm_early_cred(cred);
>> + tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
> Perhaps leave the existing panic() as-is?
Moving the panic into lsm_early_cred() reduces the panic count
and avoids code duplication here and in the Smack equivalent.
>> tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
>> - cred->security = tsec;
>> }
>>
>> /*
>> @@ -3898,53 +3895,17 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
>> sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
>> }
>>
>> -/*
>> - * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
>> - */
>> -static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
>> -{
>> - struct task_security_struct *tsec;
>> -
>> - tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
>> - if (!tsec)
>> - return -ENOMEM;
>> -
>> - cred->security = tsec;
>> - return 0;
>> -}
>> -
>> -/*
>> - * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
>> - */
>> -static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
>> -{
>> - struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
>> -
>> - /*
>> - * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
>> - * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
>> - */
>> - BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
>> - cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
> What is the world was this? Is this a "< PAGE_SIZE" poison of 0x7?
It's the other side of the creds_are_invalid() check you commented
on above.
>> - kfree(tsec);
>> -}
>> -
>> /*
>> * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
>> */
>> static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
>> gfp_t gfp)
>> {
>> - const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
>> - struct task_security_struct *tsec;
>> -
>> - old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
>> + const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
>> + struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
>>
>> - tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
>> - if (!tsec)
>> - return -ENOMEM;
>> + *tsec = *old_tsec;
>>
>> - new->security = tsec;
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> @@ -6894,6 +6855,10 @@ static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
>> }
>> #endif
>>
>> +struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes = {
>> + .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
>> +};
>> +
>> static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
>> @@ -6976,8 +6941,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
>>
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
>> - LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, selinux_cred_alloc_blank),
>> - LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free),
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
>> @@ -7133,11 +7096,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>>
>> static __init int selinux_init(void)
>> {
>> + static int finish;
>> +
>> if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
>> selinux_enabled = 0;
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> + if (!finish) {
>> + security_add_blobs(&selinux_blob_sizes);
>> + finish = 1;
>> + return 0;
>> + }
>> +
>> if (!selinux_enabled) {
>> pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
>> return 0;
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
>> index 734b6833bdff..db1c7000ada3 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
>> +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
>> @@ -25,6 +25,9 @@
>> #include <linux/binfmts.h>
>> #include <linux/in.h>
>> #include <linux/spinlock.h>
>> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
>> +#include <linux/msg.h>
>> +#include <net/sock.h>
> That's a surprising number of new headers?
Possibly not required until later.
>> #include <net/net_namespace.h>
>> #include "flask.h"
>> #include "avc.h"
>> @@ -158,6 +161,7 @@ struct bpf_security_struct {
>> u32 sid; /*SID of bpf obj creater*/
>> };
>>
>> +extern struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes;
>> static inline struct task_security_struct *selinux_cred(const struct cred *cred)
>> {
>> return cred->security;
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
>> index f3a5a138a096..b5665bdc29fc 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
>> +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
>> @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
>> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
>> #include <linux/kobject.h>
>> #include <linux/ctype.h>
>> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
>>
>> /* selinuxfs pseudo filesystem for exporting the security policy API.
>> Based on the proc code and the fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c code. */
>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
>> index 0b55d6a55b26..0c6dce446825 100644
>> --- a/security/smack/smack.h
>> +++ b/security/smack/smack.h
>> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
>> #include <linux/list.h>
>> #include <linux/rculist.h>
>> #include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
>> +#include <linux/msg.h>
>>
>> /*
>> * Use IPv6 port labeling if IPv6 is enabled and secmarks
>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> index 68ee3ae8f25c..a06ea8aa89c4 100644
>> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> @@ -309,29 +309,20 @@ static struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
>> }
>>
>> /**
>> - * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob
>> + * init_task_smack - initialize a task security blob
>> + * @tsp: blob to initialize
>> * @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task
>> * @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task
>> - * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
>> *
>> - * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
>> */
>> -static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(struct smack_known *task,
>> - struct smack_known *forked, gfp_t gfp)
>> +static void init_task_smack(struct task_smack *tsp, struct smack_known *task,
>> + struct smack_known *forked)
>> {
>> - struct task_smack *tsp;
>> -
>> - tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
>> - if (tsp == NULL)
>> - return NULL;
>> -
>> tsp->smk_task = task;
>> tsp->smk_forked = forked;
>> INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
>> INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel);
>> mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
>> -
>> - return tsp;
>> }
>>
>> /**
>> @@ -1958,14 +1949,7 @@ static int smack_file_open(struct file *file)
>> */
>> static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
>> {
>> - struct task_smack *tsp;
>> -
>> - tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp);
>> - if (tsp == NULL)
>> - return -ENOMEM;
>> -
>> - cred->security = tsp;
>> -
>> + init_task_smack(smack_cred(cred), NULL, NULL);
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> @@ -1982,10 +1966,6 @@ static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
>> struct list_head *l;
>> struct list_head *n;
>>
>> - if (tsp == NULL)
>> - return;
>> - cred->security = NULL;
>> -
>> smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
>>
>> list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
>> @@ -1993,7 +1973,6 @@ static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
>> list_del(&rp->list);
>> kfree(rp);
>> }
>> - kfree(tsp);
>> }
>>
>> /**
>> @@ -2008,14 +1987,10 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
>> gfp_t gfp)
>> {
>> struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
>> - struct task_smack *new_tsp;
>> + struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
>> int rc;
>>
>> - new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp);
>> - if (new_tsp == NULL)
>> - return -ENOMEM;
>> -
>> - new->security = new_tsp;
>> + init_task_smack(new_tsp, old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task);
>>
>> rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
>> if (rc != 0)
>> @@ -2023,10 +1998,7 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
>>
>> rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel,
>> gfp);
>> - if (rc != 0)
>> - return rc;
>> -
>> - return 0;
>> + return rc;
>> }
>>
>> /**
>> @@ -4652,6 +4624,10 @@ static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> +struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes = {
>> + .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
>> +};
>> +
>> static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
>> @@ -4830,23 +4806,35 @@ static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
>> */
>> static __init int smack_init(void)
>> {
>> - struct cred *cred;
>> + static int finish;
>> + struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
>> struct task_smack *tsp;
>>
>> if (!security_module_enable("smack"))
>> return 0;
>>
>> + if (!finish) {
>> + security_add_blobs(&smack_blob_sizes);
>> + finish = 1;
>> + return 0;
>> + }
>> +
>> smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0);
>> if (!smack_inode_cache)
>> return -ENOMEM;
>>
>> - tsp = new_task_smack(&smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor,
>> - GFP_KERNEL);
>> - if (tsp == NULL) {
>> - kmem_cache_destroy(smack_inode_cache);
>> - return -ENOMEM;
>> - }
>> + lsm_early_cred(cred);
>>
>> + /*
>> + * Set the security state for the initial task.
>> + */
>> + tsp = smack_cred(cred);
>> + init_task_smack(tsp, &smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Register with LSM
>> + */
>> + security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
>> smack_enabled = 1;
>>
>> pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
>> @@ -4860,20 +4848,9 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
>> pr_info("Smack: IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
>> #endif
>>
>> - /*
>> - * Set the security state for the initial task.
>> - */
>> - cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
>> - cred->security = tsp;
>> -
>> /* initialize the smack_known_list */
>> init_smack_known_list();
>>
>> - /*
>> - * Register with LSM
>> - */
>> - security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
>> -
>> return 0;
>> }
> I feel like some of this Smack refactoring could be split out to ease review...
Sure. Always a balance between size of patch and number of patches.
>> diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
>> index 539bcdd30bb8..0110bebe86e2 100644
>> --- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
>> +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
>> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
>> #include <linux/in.h>
>> #include <linux/in6.h>
>> #include <linux/un.h>
>> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
>> #include <net/sock.h>
>> #include <net/af_unix.h>
>> #include <net/ip.h>
>> @@ -1062,6 +1063,7 @@ void tomoyo_write_log2(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, int len, const char *fmt,
>> /********** External variable definitions. **********/
>>
>> extern bool tomoyo_policy_loaded;
>> +extern bool tomoyo_enabled;
>> extern const char * const tomoyo_condition_keyword
>> [TOMOYO_MAX_CONDITION_KEYWORD];
>> extern const char * const tomoyo_dif[TOMOYO_MAX_DOMAIN_INFO_FLAGS];
>> @@ -1196,6 +1198,17 @@ static inline void tomoyo_put_group(struct tomoyo_group *group)
>> atomic_dec(&group->head.users);
>> }
>>
>> +/**
>> + * tomoyo_cred - Get a pointer to the tomoyo cred security blob
>> + * @cred - the relevant cred
>> + *
>> + * Returns pointer to the tomoyo cred blob.
>> + */
>> +static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info **tomoyo_cred(const struct cred *cred)
>> +{
>> + return cred->security;
>> +}
>> +
>> /**
>> * tomoyo_domain - Get "struct tomoyo_domain_info" for current thread.
>> *
>> @@ -1203,7 +1216,9 @@ static inline void tomoyo_put_group(struct tomoyo_group *group)
>> */
>> static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_domain(void)
>> {
>> - return current_cred()->security;
>> + struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob = tomoyo_cred(current_cred());
>> +
>> + return *blob;
>> }
>>
>> /**
>> @@ -1216,7 +1231,9 @@ static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_domain(void)
>> static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_real_domain(struct task_struct
>> *task)
>> {
>> - return task_cred_xxx(task, security);
>> + struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob = tomoyo_cred(get_task_cred(task));
>> +
>> + return *blob;
>> }
>>
>> /**
> Shouldn't this Tomoyo cred handling get split out?
Yeah. Again, it's the patch size/count balance.
>> diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
>> index f6758dad981f..b7469fdbff01 100644
>> --- a/security/tomoyo/domain.c
>> +++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
>> @@ -678,6 +678,7 @@ static int tomoyo_environ(struct tomoyo_execve *ee)
>> */
>> int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>> {
>> + struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob;
>> struct tomoyo_domain_info *old_domain = tomoyo_domain();
>> struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
>> const char *original_name = bprm->filename;
>> @@ -843,7 +844,8 @@ int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>> domain = old_domain;
>> /* Update reference count on "struct tomoyo_domain_info". */
>> atomic_inc(&domain->users);
>> - bprm->cred->security = domain;
>> + blob = tomoyo_cred(bprm->cred);
>> + *blob = domain;
>> kfree(exename.name);
>> if (!retval) {
>> ee->r.domain = domain;
>> diff --git a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
>> index 1d3d7e7a1f05..768dff9608b1 100644
>> --- a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
>> +++ b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
>> @@ -71,9 +71,12 @@ static ssize_t tomoyo_write_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>> if (!cred) {
>> error = -ENOMEM;
>> } else {
>> - struct tomoyo_domain_info *old_domain =
>> - cred->security;
>> - cred->security = new_domain;
>> + struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob;
>> + struct tomoyo_domain_info *old_domain;
>> +
>> + blob = tomoyo_cred(cred);
>> + old_domain = *blob;
>> + *blob = new_domain;
>> atomic_inc(&new_domain->users);
>> atomic_dec(&old_domain->users);
>> commit_creds(cred);
>> @@ -234,10 +237,14 @@ static void __init tomoyo_create_entry(const char *name, const umode_t mode,
>> */
>> static int __init tomoyo_initerface_init(void)
>> {
>> + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
>> struct dentry *tomoyo_dir;
>>
>> + if (!tomoyo_enabled)
>> + return 0;
>> + domain = tomoyo_domain();
>> /* Don't create securityfs entries unless registered. */
>> - if (current_cred()->security != &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
>> + if (domain != &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
>> return 0;
>>
>> tomoyo_dir = securityfs_create_dir("tomoyo", NULL);
>> diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
>> index 9f932e2d6852..bb84e6ec3886 100644
>> --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
>> +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
>> @@ -18,7 +18,9 @@
>> */
>> static int tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *new, gfp_t gfp)
>> {
>> - new->security = NULL;
>> + struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob = tomoyo_cred(new);
>> +
>> + *blob = NULL;
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> @@ -34,8 +36,13 @@ static int tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *new, gfp_t gfp)
>> static int tomoyo_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
>> gfp_t gfp)
>> {
>> - struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = old->security;
>> - new->security = domain;
>> + struct tomoyo_domain_info **old_blob = tomoyo_cred(old);
>> + struct tomoyo_domain_info **new_blob = tomoyo_cred(new);
>> + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
>> +
>> + domain = *old_blob;
>> + *new_blob = domain;
>> +
>> if (domain)
>> atomic_inc(&domain->users);
>> return 0;
>> @@ -59,7 +66,9 @@ static void tomoyo_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
>> */
>> static void tomoyo_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
>> {
>> - struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = cred->security;
>> + struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob = tomoyo_cred(cred);
>> + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = *blob;
>> +
>> if (domain)
>> atomic_dec(&domain->users);
>> }
>> @@ -73,6 +82,9 @@ static void tomoyo_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
>> */
>> static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>> {
>> + struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob;
>> + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
>> +
>> /*
>> * Do only if this function is called for the first time of an execve
>> * operation.
>> @@ -93,13 +105,14 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>> * stored inside "bprm->cred->security" will be acquired later inside
>> * tomoyo_find_next_domain().
>> */
>> - atomic_dec(&((struct tomoyo_domain_info *)
>> - bprm->cred->security)->users);
>> + blob = tomoyo_cred(bprm->cred);
>> + domain = *blob;
>> + atomic_dec(&domain->users);
>> /*
>> * Tell tomoyo_bprm_check_security() is called for the first time of an
>> * execve operation.
>> */
>> - bprm->cred->security = NULL;
>> + *blob = NULL;
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> @@ -112,8 +125,11 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>> */
>> static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>> {
>> - struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = bprm->cred->security;
>> + struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob;
>> + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
>>
>> + blob = tomoyo_cred(bprm->cred);
>> + domain = *blob;
>> /*
>> * Execute permission is checked against pathname passed to do_execve()
>> * using current domain.
>> @@ -493,6 +509,10 @@ static int tomoyo_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
>> return tomoyo_socket_sendmsg_permission(sock, msg, size);
>> }
>>
>> +struct lsm_blob_sizes tomoyo_blob_sizes = {
>> + .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct tomoyo_domain_info *),
>> +};
>> +
>> /*
>> * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
>> * registering TOMOYO.
>> @@ -531,6 +551,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list tomoyo_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> /* Lock for GC. */
>> DEFINE_SRCU(tomoyo_ss);
>>
>> +bool tomoyo_enabled;
>> +
>> /**
>> * tomoyo_init - Register TOMOYO Linux as a LSM module.
>> *
>> @@ -538,14 +560,28 @@ DEFINE_SRCU(tomoyo_ss);
>> */
>> static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
>> {
>> + static int finish;
>> struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current_cred();
>> + struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob;
>> +
>> + if (!security_module_enable("tomoyo")) {
>> + tomoyo_enabled = false;
>> + return 0;
>> + }
>> + tomoyo_enabled = true;
>>
>> - if (!security_module_enable("tomoyo"))
>> + if (!finish) {
>> + security_add_blobs(&tomoyo_blob_sizes);
>> + finish = 1;
>> return 0;
>> + }
>> +
>> /* register ourselves with the security framework */
>> security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
>> printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
>> - cred->security = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
>> + lsm_early_cred(cred);
>> + blob = tomoyo_cred(cred);
>> + *blob = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
>> tomoyo_mm_init();
>> return 0;
>> }
>> --
>> 2.17.1
>>
>>
> -Kees
>
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