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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+haqMgKxkH12M3O358oBR-jU0uWTZSrCrm462mtgf26A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Sep 2018 16:28:24 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
LKLM <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 16/18] LSM: Allow arbitrary LSM ordering
On Mon, Sep 17, 2018 at 4:26 PM, John Johansen
<john.johansen@...onical.com> wrote:
> On 09/17/2018 04:20 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Mon, Sep 17, 2018 at 4:10 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>>> Landlock, because it target unprivileged users, should only be called
>>> after all other major (access-control) LSMs. The admin or distro must
>>> not be able to change that order in any way. This constraint doesn't
>>> apply to current LSMs, though.
>>
>> Good point! It will be easy to add LSM_ORDER_LAST, though, given the
>> machinery introduced in this series.
>>
>
> And when we have two LSMs that want to use that?
We'll cross that bridge when we come to it, but perhaps "last
exclusive"? (lsm.enable/disable to choose)
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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