linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] sched: move stack_canary field at the top of task

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Date:   Thu, 20 Sep 2018 09:54:16 +1000
From:   Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>
To:     Christophe LEROY <christophe.leroy@....fr>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc:     Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
        Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, segher@...nel.crashing.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] sched: move stack_canary field at the top of task_struct

Christophe LEROY <christophe.leroy@....fr> writes:
> Le 19/09/2018 à 13:58, Peter Zijlstra a écrit :
>> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 11:14:43AM +0000, Christophe Leroy wrote:
>>> In order to allow the use of non global stack protector canary,
>>> the stack canary needs to be located at a know offset defined
>>> in Makefile via -mstack-protector-guard-offset.
>>>
>>> On powerpc/32, register r2 points to current task_struct at
>>> all time, the stack_canary located inside task_struct can be
>>> used directly if it is located in a known place.
>>>
>>> In order to allow that, this patch moves the stack_canary field
>>> out of the randomized area of task_struct.
>> 
>> And you cannot use something like asm-offsets to extract this?
>
> I have not been able to find a way to define the compilation flags AFTER 
> building asm-offsets.h, see https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/971521/
>
> If you have a suggestion, it is welcomed.

Hmm, that's something of a hard problem.

But the stack canary is one of the things we really *do* want to be
randomised, so we should probably try to come up with a solution.

cheers