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Message-ID: <20180920080053.GM24124@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 10:00:53 +0200
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/speculation: Provide application property based
STIBP protection
On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 02:35:30PM -0700, Tim Chen wrote:
> This patch provides an application property based spectre_v2
> protection with STIBP against attack from another app from
> a sibling hyper-thread. For security sensitive non-dumpable
> app, STIBP will be turned on before switching to it for Intel
> processors vulnerable to spectre_v2.
Why does that non dumpable thing make sense? Why not use the same
prctl() we already use for SSBD?
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