linux-kernel - [PATCH v2 3/3] x86/doc/kaslr.txt: Create a separate part of document abourt KASLR at the end of file

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Message-ID: <20180921032157.GT2555@MiWiFi-R3L-srv>
Date:   Fri, 21 Sep 2018 11:21:57 +0800
From:   Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>
To:     mingo@...nel.org, tglx@...utronix.de, hpa@...or.com
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com,
        x86@...nel.org, thgarnie@...gle.com, corbet@....net,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, peterz@...radead.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] x86/doc/kaslr.txt: Create a separate part of document
 abourt KASLR at the end of file

Take the original content as the first part to only list static mm layout
tables in non-KASLR case. Then add KASLR document at the end.

Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>
---
 Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
index fc1da95e629d..58187614c7ca 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
+++ b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 
+MM layout in non-KASLR case:
+
 Virtual memory map with 4 level page tables:
 
 0000000000000000 - 00007fffffffffff (=47 bits, 128 TB) user space, different per mm
@@ -12,7 +14,6 @@ ffffea0000000000 - ffffeaffffffffff (=40 bits, 1 TB) virtual memory map (vmemmap
 ffffeb0000000000 - ffffebffffffffff (=40 bits, 1 TB) unused hole
 ffffec0000000000 - fffffbffffffffff (=44 bits, 16 TB) kasan shadow memory
 fffffc0000000000 - fffffdffffffffff (=41 bits, 2 TB) unused hole
-				    vaddr_end for KASLR
 fffffe0000000000 - fffffe7fffffffff (=39 bits, 512 GB) cpu_entry_area mapping
 fffffe8000000000 - fffffeffffffffff (=39 bits, 512 GB) LDT remap for PTI
 ffffff0000000000 - ffffff7fffffffff (=39 bits, 512 GB) %esp fixup stacks
@@ -38,7 +39,6 @@ ffd4000000000000 - ffd5ffffffffffff (=49 bits, 512 TB) virtual memory map (vmemm
 ffd6000000000000 - ffdeffffffffffff (~51 bits, 2304 TB) unused hole
 ffdf000000000000 - fffffdffffffffff (~53 bits, ~8 PB) kasan shadow memory
 fffffc0000000000 - fffffdffffffffff (=41 bits, 2 TB) unused hole
-				    vaddr_end for KASLR
 fffffe0000000000 - fffffe7fffffffff (=39 bits, 512 GB) cpu_entry_area mapping
 fffffe8000000000 - fffffeffffffffff (=39 bits, 512 GB) unused hole
 ffffff0000000000 - ffffff7fffffffff (=39 bits, 512 GB) %esp fixup stacks
@@ -70,10 +70,56 @@ memory window (this size is arbitrary, it can be raised later if needed).
 The mappings are not part of any other kernel PGD and are only available
 during EFI runtime calls.
 
-Note that if CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY is enabled, the direct mapping of all
-physical memory, vmalloc/ioremap space and virtual memory map are randomized.
-Their order is preserved but their base will be offset early at boot time.
+KASLR
+=========================================================================
+
+Kernel Adress Space Layout Randomization (KASLR) consists of two parts
+which work together to enhance the security of the Linux kernel:
+
+ - Kernel text KASLR
+ - Memory region KASLR
+
+Kernel text KASLR
+-----------------
+The physical address and virtual address of kernel text itself are
+randomized to a different position separately. The physical address of
+the kernel can be anywhere under 64TB, while the virtual address of the
+kernel is restricted between [0xffffffff80000000, ffffffffbfffffff],
+the 1GB space.
+
+ffffffff80000000 - ffffffffbfffffff (1 GB)  kernel text mapping, from phys 0
+ffffffffc0000000 - fffffffffeffffff (1520 MB) module mapping space
+
+Note: The kernel text KASLR uses 1 GB space to randomize the position of
+kernel image, and it's defalutly enabled. If KASLR config option
+CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is not enabled, the space for kernel image will be
+shrink to 512 MB, increase the size of modules area to 1.5 GB.
+
+Memory region KASLR
+-------------------
+If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY is enabled, the below three memory regions
+are randomized. Their order is preserved but their base will be offset
+early at boot time.
+
+   - direct mapping region
+   - vmalloc region
+   - vmemmap region
+
+The KASLR address range must not overlap with anything except the KASAN
+shadow area, which is correct as KASAN disables KASLR.
+
+So from the original starting address of the direct mapping region for physical
+RAM to the starting address of the cpu_entry_area mapping region, namely
+[0xffff880000000000 - 0xfffffdffffffffff], the scope of 118 TB in all is
+the virtual address space where memory region KASLR can be allowed to move
+those memory regions around. After KASLR manipulation is done, their layout
+looks like:
 
-Be very careful vs. KASLR when changing anything here. The KASLR address
-range must not overlap with anything except the KASAN shadow area, which is
-correct as KASAN disables KASLR.
+Name            Starting address        Size                                         Aligned
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+direct mapping  page_offset_base        [actual size of system RAM + 10 TB padding]  1 GB
+*guard hole     random                  random                                       1 GB
+vmalloc         vmalloc_base            32 TB                                        1 GB
+*guard hole     random                  random                                       1 GB
+vmemmap         vmemmap_base            1 TB                                         1 GB
+*guard hole     random                  random                                       1 GB
-- 
2.13.6