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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJRHN6hMwk49Ss8knSX4CJa0UkWe0pPMHbnFGwECjo_rw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 17:37:18 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v2 18/26] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered
LSMs for init
On Thu, Sep 20, 2018 at 5:04 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> wrote:
> On 9/20/2018 9:23 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> This constructs a list of ordered LSMs to initialize, using a hard-coded
>> list of only "integrity": minor LSMs continue to have direct hook calls,
>> and major LSMs continue to initialize separately.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>
> Do you think that this mechanism will be sufficiently
> flexible to accommodate dynamically loaded security modules
> in the future? While I am not personally an advocate of
> dynamically loaded security modules I have been working to
> ensure that I haven't done anything that would actively
> interfere with someone who did.
I don't think it does, no. This is all just the boot time
initialization order, so a dynamic LSM would be unchanged: it would
initialize at module load time. :)
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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