linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH security-next v2 26/26] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization

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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j++wXMUXuqT7m5MZdeXqO=i7RgyKZoLwELfSTx6UPOVSA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 20 Sep 2018 17:45:47 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Cc:     James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
        Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
        LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v2 26/26] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to
 ordered initialization

On Thu, Sep 20, 2018 at 5:25 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> wrote:
> On 9/20/2018 9:23 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>  config LSM_ORDER
>>       string "Default initialization order of builtin LSMs"
>> -     default "yama,loadpin,integrity"
>> +     default "yama,loadpin,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor"
>
> If I want to compile all the major modules into my kernel and use
> AppArmor by default would I use
>
>         default "yama,loadpin,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo"
>
> or
>
>         default "yama,loadpin,integrity,apparmor"

I was expecting the former, but the latter will have the same result.

> When we have "blob-sharing" how could I compile in tomoyo,
> but exclude it without a boot line option?

Ooh, yes, this series has no way to do that. Perhaps
CONFIG_LSM_DISABLE in the same form as CONFIG_LSM_ORDER? I would
totally remove LoadPin's CONFIG for this in favor it.

> When we have full stacking, how could I compile in selinux
> but exclude it?

Yup, same problem. Same suggested solution?

Should lsm.enable/disable= also become a comma-separated list, or
should I leave it as a multi-instance thing like I have it?

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security