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Message-Id: <20180921150351.20898-23-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2018 08:03:46 -0700
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
To: x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 22/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
The shadow stack for clone/fork is handled as the following:
(1) If ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM)) == CLONE_VM),
the kernel allocates (and frees on thread exit) a new SHSTK
for the child.
It is possible for the kernel to complete the clone syscall
and set the child's SHSTK pointer to NULL and let the child
thread allocate a SHSTK for itself. There are two issues
in this approach: It is not compatible with existing code
that does inline syscall and it cannot handle signals before
the child can successfully allocate a SHSTK.
(2) For (clone_flags & CLONE_VFORK), the child uses the existing
SHSTK.
(3) For all other cases, the SHSTK is copied/reused whenever the
parent or the child does a call/ret.
This patch handles cases (1) & (2). Case (3) is handled in
the SHSTK page fault patches.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 3 +++
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 7 ++++++
5 files changed, 47 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
index d9ae3d86cdd7..b7b33e1026bb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -17,12 +17,14 @@ struct cet_status {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
int cet_setup_shstk(void);
+int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
void cet_disable_shstk(void);
void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp);
int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor, unsigned long *new_ssp);
#else
static inline int cet_setup_shstk(void) { return 0; }
+static inline int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p) { return 0; }
static inline void cet_disable_shstk(void) {}
static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {}
static inline int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp) { return 0; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index eeeb9289c764..8da7c999b7ee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
#include <asm/mpx.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
extern atomic64_t last_mm_ctx_id;
@@ -223,6 +224,8 @@ do { \
#else
#define deactivate_mm(tsk, mm) \
do { \
+ if (!tsk->vfork_done) \
+ cet_disable_free_shstk(tsk); \
load_gs_index(0); \
loadsegment(fs, 0); \
} while (0)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
index 5cc4be6e0982..ce0b3b7b1160 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
@@ -134,6 +134,40 @@ int cet_setup_shstk(void)
return 0;
}
+int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ unsigned long addr, size;
+ struct cet_user_state *state;
+
+ if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ state = get_xsave_addr(&tsk->thread.fpu.state.xsave,
+ XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER);
+
+ if (!state)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ size = tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size;
+ if (size == 0)
+ size = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK);
+
+ addr = do_mmap_locked(0, size, PROT_READ,
+ MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, VM_SHSTK);
+
+ if (addr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) {
+ tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base = 0;
+ tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size = 0;
+ tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0;
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ state->user_ssp = (u64)(addr + size - sizeof(u64));
+ tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base = addr;
+ tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size = size;
+ return 0;
+}
+
void cet_disable_shstk(void)
{
u64 r;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 4a776da4c28c..440f012ef925 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ void exit_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
free_vm86(t);
+ cet_disable_free_shstk(tsk);
fpu__drop(fpu);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index ea5ea850348d..9cdbd87bb908 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -325,6 +325,13 @@ int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp,
if (sp)
childregs->sp = sp;
+ /* Allocate a new shadow stack for pthread */
+ if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM)) == CLONE_VM) {
+ err = cet_setup_thread_shstk(p);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
err = -ENOMEM;
if (unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(me, TIF_IO_BITMAP))) {
p->thread.io_bitmap_ptr = kmemdup(me->thread.io_bitmap_ptr,
--
2.17.1
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