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Date: Sat, 22 Sep 2018 01:15:42 +0100
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC: akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@...nel.org>,
"Josh Poimboeuf" <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@...nel.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@...radead.org>,
"David Woodhouse" <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
"David Woodhouse" <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
"Arjan van de Ven" <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
"Dan Williams" <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@...en8.de>,
"Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 43/63] x86/speculation: Clean up various Spectre
related details
3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
commit 21e433bdb95bdf3aa48226fd3d33af608437f293 upstream.
Harmonize all the Spectre messages so that a:
dmesg | grep -i spectre
... gives us most Spectre related kernel boot messages.
Also fix a few other details:
- clarify a comment about firmware speculation control
- s/KPTI/PTI
- remove various line-breaks that made the code uglier
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -224,8 +224,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
else {
- ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg,
- sizeof(arg));
+ ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
if (ret < 0)
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
@@ -246,8 +245,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __
cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD ||
cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) &&
!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
- pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
- mitigation_options[i].option);
+ pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option);
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
@@ -317,14 +315,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
goto retpoline_auto;
break;
}
- pr_err("kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
+ pr_err("Spectre mitigation: kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
return;
retpoline_auto:
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
retpoline_amd:
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
- pr_err("LFENCE not serializing. Switching to generic retpoline\n");
+ pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n");
goto retpoline_generic;
}
mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD :
@@ -342,7 +340,7 @@ retpoline_auto:
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
/*
- * If neither SMEP or KPTI are available, there is a risk of
+ * If neither SMEP nor PTI are available, there is a risk of
* hitting userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch
* from a shallow call stack to a deeper one. To prevent this fill
* the entire RSB, even when using IBRS.
@@ -356,13 +354,13 @@ retpoline_auto:
if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER) &&
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
- pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n");
+ pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
}
/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
- pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
+ pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
}
/*
@@ -378,8 +376,7 @@ retpoline_auto:
#undef pr_fmt
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
-ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
- struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
@@ -388,16 +385,14 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device
return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
}
-ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
- struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
}
-ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
- struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
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