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Message-Id: <20180924181500.125257-1-ghackmann@google.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2018 11:15:00 -0700
From: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@...roid.com>
To: Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Omer Tripp <trippo@...gle.com>, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@...gle.com>,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] fs: fix possible Spectre V1 indexing in __close_fd()
__close_fd() is reachable via the close() syscall with a
userspace-controlled fd. Ensure that it can't be used to speculatively
access past the end of current->fdt.
Reported-by: Omer Tripp <trippo@...gle.com>
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@...gle.com>
---
fs/file.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/file.c b/fs/file.c
index 7ffd6e9d103d..a80cf82be96b 100644
--- a/fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/file.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
unsigned int sysctl_nr_open __read_mostly = 1024*1024;
unsigned int sysctl_nr_open_min = BITS_PER_LONG;
@@ -626,6 +627,7 @@ int __close_fd(struct files_struct *files, unsigned fd)
fdt = files_fdtable(files);
if (fd >= fdt->max_fds)
goto out_unlock;
+ fd = array_index_nospec(fd, fdt->max_fds);
file = fdt->fd[fd];
if (!file)
goto out_unlock;
--
2.19.0.397.gdd90340f6a-goog
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