linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v4 00/19] LSM: Module stacking for SARA and Landlock

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Message-ID: <28e4ca6d-e86c-ee1f-ead8-f03d1ccd7d54@schaufler-ca.com>
Date:   Mon, 24 Sep 2018 13:33:51 -0700
From:   Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To:     Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        SE Linux <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        LKLM <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        "linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
        Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
        Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 00/19] LSM: Module stacking for SARA and Landlock

On 9/24/2018 10:53 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> On 2018/09/25 2:16, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> Not all of LKM-based LSMs use security blobs. And some of LKM-based LSMs
>>> might use security blobs for only a few objects. For example, AKARI uses
>>> inode security blob for remembering whether source address/port of an
>>> accept()ed socket was already checked, only during accept() operation and
>>> first socket operation on the accept()ed socket. Thus, there is no need
>>> to waste memory by assigning blobs for all inode objects.
>> The first question is why use an inode blob? Shouldn't you
>> be using a socket blob for this socket based information?
> Indeed. AKARI can as well use security_sk_free() using address of
> "struct sock" as a key.
>
>> If you only want information part of the time you can declare
>> a pointer sized blob and manage what hangs off that as you will.
>> I personally think that the added complexity of conditional
>> blob management is more pain than it's worth, but if you want
>> a really big blob, but only on occasion, I could see doing it.
> LKM based LSMs are too late for updating blob_sizes.* fields.

That is true with the code in this patch set. As I mentioned,
changing the blob handling to include a header with real use
information would be required.

> Even if they could, they after all have to somehow check whether
> corresponding init hook was called. That's checking for NULL.

Right.

>>>>> @@ -1202,11 +1183,11 @@ void security_file_free(struct file *file)
>>>>>  {
>>>>>  	void *blob;
>>>>>  
>>>>> +	call_void_hook(file_free_security, file);
>>>>> +
>>>>>  	if (!lsm_file_cache)
>>>>>  		return;
>>>>>  
>>>>> -	call_void_hook(file_free_security, file);
>>>>> -
>>>> Why does this make sense? If the lsm_file_cache isn't
>>>> initialized you can't have allocated any file blobs,
>>>> no module can have initialized a file blob, hence there
>>>> can be nothing for the module to do.
>>>>
>>> For modules (not limited to LKM-based LSMs) which want to use
>>> file blobs for only a few objects and avoid wasting memory by
>>> allocating file blobs to all file objects.
>>>
>>> Infrastructure based blob management fits well for LSM modules
>>> which want to assign blobs to all objects (like SELinux). But
>>> forcing infrastructure based blob management can become a huge
>>> waste of memory for LSM modules which want to assign blobs to
>>> only a few objects. Unconditionally calling file_free_security
>>> hook (as with other hooks) preserves a room for allowing the
>>> latter type of LSM modules without using infrastructure based
>>> blob management.
>> There is a hypothetical issue here, but that would require abuse
>> of the infrastructure. Having a file_free_security hook that doesn't
>> free a security blob allocated by file_alloc_security may coincidentaly
>> be useful, but that's not the intent of the hook.
>>
> The free hook might be used for freeing resources which were not allocated
> by alloc hook. Yama is using task_free hook without task_alloc hook.
> Someone might want to use file_free hook without file_alloc hook.

OK, you're correct. Checking for an initialized kmem_cache isn't appropriate.