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Message-Id: <20180926203446.2004-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 13:34:41 -0700
From: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
casey.schaufler@...el.com, dave.hansen@...el.com,
deneen.t.dock@...el.com, kristen@...ux.intel.com,
arjan@...ux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v5 0/5] LSM: Support ptrace sidechannel access checks
v5: Revamped to match Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
Harden spectrev2 userspace-userspace protection v7
Fixed locking issues in the LSM code.
Dropped the new LSM hook and use a ptrace hook instead.
v4: select namespace checks if user namespaces are enabled
and credential checks are request.
v3: get_task_cred wasn't a good choice due to refcounts.
Use lower level protection instead
v2: SELinux access policy corrected.
Use real_cred instead of cred.
This patchset provide a mechanism by which a security module
can advise the system about potential side-channel vulnerabilities.
The existing security modules have been updated to avoid locking
issues in the face of PTRACE_MODE_SCHED. A new security
module is provided to make determinations regarding task attributes
including namespaces.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 +++
kernel/ptrace.c | 2 -
security/Kconfig | 1 +
security/Makefile | 2 +
security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +-
security/apparmor/include/ipc.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/ipc.c | 8 ++--
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 5 ++-
security/commoncap.c | 2 +
security/security.c | 1 +
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +
security/sidechannel/Kconfig | 13 ++++++
security/sidechannel/Makefile | 1 +
security/sidechannel/sidechannel.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 +-
15 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
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