| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2018 17:43:59 -0700
From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org
Subject: [Patch v2 4/4] x86/speculation: Add prctl to control indirect branch speculation per process
To migitgate possible app to app attack from branch target buffer poisoning,
a new prctl is provided to control branch speculation for applications in
user app. The following interfaces are provided:
prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_INDIR_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
- Disable branch target speculation to protect against app to app
style attack using IBPB and STIBP
prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_INDIR_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
- Allow branch target speculation, no mitigation for Spectre V2
prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_INDIR_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0)
- Query the indirect branch speculation restriction on a process
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 +-
Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst | 8 +++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 30 ++-------
fs/exec.c | 13 +++-
include/linux/sched.h | 5 ++
include/linux/sched/coredump.h | 2 +-
include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 1 +
kernel/cred.c | 2 +-
kernel/sys.c | 2 +-
tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 1 +
11 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 6243144..640ce9a 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4190,7 +4190,9 @@
[X86] Control app to app mitigation of Spectre variant 2
(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
- lite - only turn on mitigation for non-dumpable processes
+ lite - turn on mitigation for non-dumpable processes
+ or processes that has indirect branch restricted
+ via prctl's PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL option
strict - protect against attacks for all user processes
auto - let kernel decide lite or strict mode
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
index 32f3d55..aa71e84 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
@@ -92,3 +92,11 @@ Speculation misfeature controls
* prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
* prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
* prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);
+
+- PR_INDIR_BRANCH: Indirect Branch Speculation in Applications
+ (Mitigate Spectre V2 style user space app to app attack)
+
+ Invocations:
+ * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_INDIR_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0);
+ * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_INDIR_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
+ * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_INDIR_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 052f1a5..2ec531f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/sched/coredump.h>
#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
@@ -150,7 +151,7 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
static const char *spectre_v2_app2app_strings[] = {
[SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_NONE] = "App-App Vulnerable",
- [SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_LITE] = "App-App Mitigation: Protect only non-dumpable process",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_LITE] = "App-App Mitigation: Protect non-dumpable or indir branch restricted process",
[SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_STRICT] = "App-App Mitigation: Full app to app attack protection",
};
@@ -728,17 +729,74 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
return 0;
}
+static int indir_branch_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+ bool update;
+
+ if (spectre_v2_app2app_enabled != SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_LITE &&
+ spectre_v2_app2app_enabled != SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_STRICT)
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ switch (ctrl) {
+ case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
+ if (spectre_v2_app2app_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_STRICT)
+ return -ENXIO;
+ if (get_dumpable(task->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
+ return -ENXIO;
+ task_clear_spec_indir_branch_disable(task);
+ update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_STIBP);
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+ if (spectre_v2_app2app_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_STRICT)
+ return 0;
+ task_set_spec_indir_branch_disable(task);
+ update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_STIBP);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If being set on non-current task, delay setting the CPU
+ * mitigation until it is next scheduled.
+ * Use speculative_store_bypass_update will update SPEC_CTRL MSR
+ */
+ if (task == current && update)
+ speculative_store_bypass_update_current();
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
unsigned long ctrl)
{
switch (which) {
case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
return ssb_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
+ case PR_INDIR_BRANCH:
+ return indir_branch_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
default:
return -ENODEV;
}
}
+void arch_set_dumpable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm, int value)
+{
+ if (!static_branch_unlikely(&spectre_v2_app_lite))
+ return;
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+ return;
+
+ if ((unsigned) value != SUID_DUMP_USER) {
+ set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_STIBP);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!task_spec_indir_branch_disable(tsk)) {
+ clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_STIBP);
+ }
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task)
{
@@ -766,11 +824,33 @@ static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
}
}
+static int indir_branch_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+ return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
+
+ switch (spectre_v2_app2app_enabled) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_NONE:
+ return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_LITE:
+ if (task_spec_indir_branch_disable(task) ||
+ get_dumpable(task->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_STRICT:
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+ default:
+ return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
+ }
+}
+
int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
{
switch (which) {
case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
return ssb_prctl_get(task);
+ case PR_INDIR_BRANCH:
+ return indir_branch_prctl_get(task);
default:
return -ENODEV;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index b3d1daa..65329a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -184,8 +184,9 @@ static void sync_current_stack_to_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
static bool ibpb_needed(struct task_struct *tsk, u64 last_ctx_id)
{
/*
- * For lite protection mode, we only protect the non-dumpable
- * processes.
+ * For lite protection mode, we protect processes
+ * where the user explicitly disable indirect branch
+ * speculation or mark the process as non-dumpable.
*
* Otherwise check if the current (previous) task has access to the memory
* of the @tsk (next) task for strict app to app protection.
@@ -200,30 +201,12 @@ static bool ibpb_needed(struct task_struct *tsk, u64 last_ctx_id)
return false;
if (static_branch_unlikely(&spectre_v2_app_lite))
- return (get_dumpable(tsk->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER);
+ return (get_dumpable(tsk->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER ||
+ task_thread_info(tsk)->flags & _TIF_STIBP);
else
return (__ptrace_may_access(tsk, PTRACE_MODE_IBPB));
}
-static void set_stibp(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
- /*
- * For lite protection mode, we set STIBP only
- * for non-dumpable processes.
- */
-
- if (!static_branch_unlikely(&spectre_v2_app_lite))
- return;
-
- if (!tsk || !tsk->mm)
- return;
-
- if (get_dumpable(tsk->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
- set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_STIBP);
- else
- clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_STIBP);
-}
-
void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
@@ -315,9 +298,6 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
ibpb_needed(tsk, last_ctx_id))
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
- if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
- set_stibp(tsk);
-
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) {
/*
* If our current stack is in vmalloc space and isn't
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 1ebf6e5..89edadd 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1362,9 +1362,9 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
!(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
- set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
+ set_dumpable(current, current->mm, suid_dumpable);
else
- set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
+ set_dumpable(current, current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
arch_setup_new_exec();
perf_event_exec();
@@ -1940,10 +1940,15 @@ void set_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *new)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_binfmt);
+void __weak arch_set_dumpable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm, int value)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
/*
* set_dumpable stores three-value SUID_DUMP_* into mm->flags.
*/
-void set_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm, int value)
+void set_dumpable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm, int value)
{
unsigned long old, new;
@@ -1954,6 +1959,8 @@ void set_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm, int value)
old = READ_ONCE(mm->flags);
new = (old & ~MMF_DUMPABLE_MASK) | value;
} while (cmpxchg(&mm->flags, old, new) != old);
+
+ arch_set_dumpable(tsk, mm, value);
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(execve,
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 977cb57..b0a78fd 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1439,6 +1439,7 @@ static inline bool is_percpu_thread(void)
#define PFA_SPREAD_SLAB 2 /* Spread some slab caches over cpuset */
#define PFA_SPEC_SSB_DISABLE 3 /* Speculative Store Bypass disabled */
#define PFA_SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE 4 /* Speculative Store Bypass force disabled*/
+#define PFA_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH_DISABLE 5 /* Indirect branch speculation restricted in apps */
#define TASK_PFA_TEST(name, func) \
static inline bool task_##func(struct task_struct *p) \
@@ -1470,6 +1471,10 @@ TASK_PFA_CLEAR(SPEC_SSB_DISABLE, spec_ssb_disable)
TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ssb_force_disable)
TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ssb_force_disable)
+TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH_DISABLE, spec_indir_branch_disable)
+TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH_DISABLE, spec_indir_branch_disable)
+TASK_PFA_CLEAR(SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH_DISABLE, spec_indir_branch_disable)
+
static inline void
current_restore_flags(unsigned long orig_flags, unsigned long flags)
{
diff --git a/include/linux/sched/coredump.h b/include/linux/sched/coredump.h
index ec912d0..4284350 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched/coredump.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched/coredump.h
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
#define MMF_DUMPABLE_BITS 2
#define MMF_DUMPABLE_MASK ((1 << MMF_DUMPABLE_BITS) - 1)
-extern void set_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm, int value);
+extern void set_dumpable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm, int value);
/*
* This returns the actual value of the suid_dumpable flag. For things
* that are using this for checking for privilege transitions, it must
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
index c0d7ea0..06f71f6 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
#define PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 53
/* Speculation control variants */
# define PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS 0
+# define PR_INDIR_BRANCH 1
/* Return and control values for PR_SET/GET_SPECULATION_CTRL */
# define PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED 0
# define PR_SPEC_PRCTL (1UL << 0)
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index ecf0365..de3f486 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
!gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) ||
!cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) {
if (task->mm)
- set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
+ set_dumpable(task, task->mm, suid_dumpable);
task->pdeath_signal = 0;
smp_wmb();
}
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index cf5c675..78af561 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -2292,7 +2292,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
error = -EINVAL;
break;
}
- set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2);
+ set_dumpable(me, me->mm, arg2);
break;
case PR_SET_UNALIGN:
diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
index c0d7ea0..06f71f6 100644
--- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
#define PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 53
/* Speculation control variants */
# define PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS 0
+# define PR_INDIR_BRANCH 1
/* Return and control values for PR_SET/GET_SPECULATION_CTRL */
# define PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED 0
# define PR_SPEC_PRCTL (1UL << 0)
--
2.9.4
Powered by blists - more mailing lists