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Message-ID: <87in2qpytv.fsf@xmission.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2018 20:41:48 +0200
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: x86@...nel.org, platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org,
dave.hansen@...el.com, sean.j.christopherson@...el.com,
nhorman@...hat.com, npmccallum@...hat.com, serge.ayoun@...el.com,
shay.katz-zamir@...el.com, linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org,
andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org (open list:GENERIC INCLUDE/ASM HEADER FILES),
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org (open list)
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 08/19] signal: x86/sgx: Add SIGSEGV siginfo code for SGX EPCM fault
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com> writes:
> From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
>
> The SGX Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM) is a hardware-managed table
> that enforces accesses to an enclave's EPC page in addition to the
> software-managed kernel page tables, i.e. the effective permissions
> for an EPC page are a logical AND of the kernel's page tables and
> the corresponding EPCM entry. The primary purpose of the EPCM is
> to prevent a malcious or compromised kernel from attacking an enclave
> by modifying the enclave's page tables. The EPCM entires for an
> enclave are populated when the enclave is built and verified, using
> metadata provided by the enclave that is included in the measurement
> used to verify the enclave.
>
> In normal operation of a properly functioning, non-malicious kernel
> (and enclave), the EPCM permissions will never trigger a fault, i.e.
> the kernel may make the permissions for an EPC page more restrictive,
> e.g. mark it not-present to swap out the EPC page, but the kernel will
> never make its permissions less restrictive.
>
> But, there is a legitimate scenario in which the kernel's page tables
> can become less restrictive than the EPCM: on current hardware all
> enclaves are destroyed (by hardware) on a transition to S3 or lower
> sleep states, i.e. all EPCM entries are invalid (not-present) after
> the system resumes from its sleep state.
>
> Unfortunately, on CPUs that support only SGX1, EPCM violations result
> in a #GP. The upside of the #GP is that no kernel changes are needed
> to deal with the EPCM being blasted away by hardware, e.g. userspace
> gets a SIGSEGV, assumes the EPCM was lost and restarts its enclave
> and everyone is happy. The downside is that userspace has to assume
> the SIGSEGV was because the EPC was lost (or possibly do some leg work
> to rule out other causes).
>
> In SGX2, the oddity of delivering a #GP due to what are inherently
> paging related violations is remedied. CPUs that support SGX2 deliver
> EPCM violations as #PFs with a new SGX error code bit set. So, now
> that hardware provides us with a way to unequivocally determine that
> a fault was due to a EPCM violation, define a signfo code for SIGSEGV
> so that the information can be passed onto userspace.
>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
> ---
> include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 4 ++++
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
> index 80e2a7227205..fdd898e2325b 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
> @@ -225,7 +225,11 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
> #else
> # define SEGV_PKUERR 4 /* failed protection key checks */
> #endif
> +#ifdef __x86_64__
> +#define SEGV_SGXERR 5 /* SGX Enclave Page Cache Map fault */
> +#else
> #define SEGV_ACCADI 5 /* ADI not enabled for mapped object */
> +#endif
Don't do this crazy ifdef thing. si_codes are not supposed to be per
architecture. There are a few historical bugs but with a 32bit space
it is just stupid to add #ifdefs.
Just set.
#define SEGV_SGXERR 8 and increase NSIGSEGV
Anything else is just asking for trouble. Especially when you want to
get SGX working on itaninum.
> #define SEGV_ADIDERR 6 /* Disrupting MCD error */
> #define SEGV_ADIPERR 7 /* Precise MCD exception */
> #define NSIGSEGV 7
Eric
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