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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1809280813270.8410@namei.org>
Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2018 08:13:32 +1000 (AEST)
From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
cc: LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
SE Linux <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
LKLM <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
"linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 04/19] SELinux: Remove cred security blob poisoning
On Fri, 21 Sep 2018, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> The SELinux specific credential poisioning only makes sense
> if SELinux is managing the credentials. As the intent of this
> patch set is to move the blob management out of the modules
> and into the infrastructure, the SELinux specific code has
> to go. The poisioning could be introduced into the infrastructure
> at some later date.
If it's useful, it should be incorporated into core LSM, otherwise that's
a regression for SELinux.
--
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
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