linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v14 09/19] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SEGV_SGXERR for #PFs w/ PF

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Message-Id: <CDE2F14E-97B8-4648-B1F3-4B21703BDDB3@amacapital.net>
Date:   Thu, 27 Sep 2018 07:41:00 -0700
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        "Christopherson, Sean J" <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Andrew Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        Platform Driver <platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org>,
        nhorman@...hat.com, npmccallum@...hat.com,
        "Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@...el.com>, shay.katz-zamir@...el.com,
        linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 09/19] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SEGV_SGXERR for #PFs w/ PF_SGX



> On Sep 27, 2018, at 7:21 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
> 
>> On Wed, Sep 26, 2018 at 03:37:45PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> Yeah.  Maybe like this: > > xorl %eax,%eax > eenter_insn:
>> ENCLU[whatever]
>> eenter_landing_pad:
>> ret
>> 
>> And the kernel would use the existing vdso2c vdso-symbol-finding
>> mechanism to do the fixup.
>> 
>>> 
>>> How would a syscall work, though?  I assume we can't just enter the
>>> enclave from ring0.
>> 
>> My understanding of how AEX works is a bit vague, but maybe a syscall
>> could reuse the mechanism?  The vDSO approach seems considerably
>> simpler.
>> 
>> We do need to make sure that a fault that happens on or after return
>> from an AEX event does the right thing.  But I'm still vague on how
>> that works, sigh.
>> 
>> --Andy
> 
> Returning from AEX does not differ from any other memory access event so
> AFAIK it should be handled right with the proposed solution already.
> For convenience I think we could have a fixed trampoline for AEX e.g.
> this how it is implemented in the open source LE that I did:
> 
> sgx_get_token:
>    push    %rbx
>    mov    $0x02, %rax
>    mov    %rsi, %rbx
>    mov    %rdx, %rsi
>    mov    $sgx_async_exit, %rcx
> sgx_async_exit:
>    ENCLU
>    pop    %rbx
>    ret
> 
> BTW, if I converted the in-kernel LE as a standalone test program, would
> that be useful for basic testing of the series?
> 
> 

Definitely. Especially if you stick it in selftests/x86 and make it exit cleanly (error code 0) on unsupported hardware.