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Message-ID: <20180926233903.38fb598a@alans-desktop>
Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 23:39:03 +0100
From: Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
Cc: TongZhang <ztong@...edu>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
adobriyan@...il.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
viro@...iv.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: Leaking path for set_task_comm
> Trying to depend on task name for anything security sensitive is at
> _really_ bad idea, so it seems unlikely that a LSM would want to
> protect the process name. (And if they did, the first thing I would
> ask is "Why? What are you trying to do? Do you realize how many
> *other* ways the process name can be spoofed or otherwise controlled
> by a potentially malicious user?")
Two processes that should not be able to otherwise communicate can keep
changing their name to a chunk of data, waiting for an ack flag name
change back.
Alan
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