linux-kernel - RE: [PATCH v5 5/5] sidechannel: Linux Security Module for sidechannel

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Fri, 28 Sep 2018 17:40:52 +0000
From:   "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>
To:     James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
CC:     Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
        "kristen@...ux.intel.com" <kristen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
        "Dock, Deneen T" <deneen.t.dock@...el.com>,
        kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        "selinux@...ho.nsa.gov" <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v5 5/5] sidechannel: Linux Security Module for
 sidechannel

> -----Original Message-----
> From: James Morris [mailto:jmorris@...ei.org]
> Sent: Friday, September 28, 2018 9:33 AM
> To: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
> Cc: Schaufler, Casey <casey.schaufler@...el.com>; Casey Schaufler
> <casey@...aufler-ca.com>; kristen@...ux.intel.com; Kernel Hardening
> <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>; Dock, Deneen T
> <deneen.t.dock@...el.com>; kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>;
> Hansen, Dave <dave.hansen@...el.com>; linux-security-module <linux-security-
> module@...r.kernel.org>; selinux@...ho.nsa.gov; Arjan van de Ven
> <arjan@...ux.intel.com>
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 5/5] sidechannel: Linux Security Module for sidechannel
> 
> On Fri, 28 Sep 2018, Jann Horn wrote:
> 
> > > so with this hard-coded logic, you are saying this case is
> > > 'safe' in a sidechannel context.
> > >
> > > Which hints at the deeper issue that containers are a userland
> > > abstraction.  Protection of containers needs to be defined by userland
> > > policy.
> >
> > Or just compare mount namespaces additionally/instead. I think that
> > containers will always use those, because AFAIK nobody uses chroot()
> > for containers, given that the kernel makes absolutely no security
> > guarantees about chroot().
> 
> We can't define this in the kernel. It has no concept of containers.
> 
> People utilize some combination of namespaces and cgroups and call them
> containers,

There is an amazing variety of things called containers out there.
I cite them as a use case, not a requirement.

> but we can't make assumptions from the kernel on what any of
> this means from a security point of view, and hard-code kernel policy
> based on those assumptions.

We can assume that namespaces are being used as a separation mechanism.
That makes processes in different namespaces potentially vulnerable to
side-channel attacks. That's true regardless of whether or not someone is
using namespaces to implement containers. 

> This is violating the principal of separating mechanism and policy, and
> also imposing semantics across the kernel/user boundary. The latter
> creates an ABI which we can then never break.

The effects of the sidechannel security module are not API visible.
The potential impact is on performance. This implementation of
PTRACE_MODE_SCHED does not change what happens, but may affect
when it happens. It is intended to aid in optimizing the use of expensive
anti-side-channel countermeasures.