linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering

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Message-ID: <cb49b4c4-a379-7a8e-41a6-6e6a4afb6fe5@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date:   Fri, 28 Sep 2018 16:25:41 -0400
From:   Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Cc:     James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
        Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
        LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering

On 09/28/2018 04:01 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 28, 2018 at 8:55 AM, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> On 9/24/2018 5:18 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> v3:
>>> - add CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE and refactor resulting logic
>>
>> Kees, you can add my
>>
>>          Reviewed-by:Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
>>
>> for this entire patch set. Thank you for taking this on, it's
>> a significant and important chunk of the LSM infrastructure
>> update.
> 
> Thanks!
> 
> John, you'd looked at this a bit too -- do the results line up with
> your expectations?
> 
> Any thoughts from SELinux, TOMOYO, or IMA folks?

What's it relative to?  First patch fails for me on current security/next.

Is there a branch in your repo that has the v3 patches?

> 
> -Kees
> 
>>
>>
>>> ...
>>> Breakdown of patches:
>>>
>>> Infrastructure improvements (no logical changes):
>>>    LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization
>>>    vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section
>>>    LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info
>>>    LSM: Remove initcall tracing
>>>    LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info
>>>    vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA
>>>    LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM()
>>>    LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info
>>>    LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure
>>>    LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures
>>>
>>> Split "integrity" out into "ordered initialization" (no logical changes):
>>>    LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR
>>>    LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization
>>>
>>> Provide centralized LSM enable/disable infrastructure:
>>>    LoadPin: Rename "enable" to "enforce"
>>>    LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state
>>>    LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs
>>>    LSM: Prepare for arbitrary LSM enabling
>>>    LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE
>>>    LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable=
>>>    LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic
>>>    LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable
>>>
>>> Provide centralized LSM ordering infrastructure:
>>>    LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init
>>>    LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER
>>>    LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering
>>>
>>> Move minor LSMs into ordered LSM initialization:
>>>    LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM
>>>    Yama: Initialize as ordered LSM
>>>    LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order
>>>    capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST
>>>
>>> Move major LSMs into ordered LSM initialization:
>>>    LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM
>>>    LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization
>>>
>>> -Kees
>>>
>>>   .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  20 +
>>>   arch/arc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S                 |   1 -
>>>   arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S             |   1 -
>>>   arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S               |   1 -
>>>   arch/h8300/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S               |   1 -
>>>   arch/microblaze/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S          |   2 -
>>>   arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S             |   2 -
>>>   arch/um/include/asm/common.lds.S              |   2 -
>>>   arch/xtensa/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S              |   1 -
>>>   include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h             |  25 +-
>>>   include/linux/init.h                          |   2 -
>>>   include/linux/lsm_hooks.h                     |  43 ++-
>>>   include/linux/module.h                        |   1 -
>>>   security/Kconfig                              |  61 ++-
>>>   security/apparmor/lsm.c                       |  16 +-
>>>   security/commoncap.c                          |   8 +-
>>>   security/integrity/iint.c                     |   5 +-
>>>   security/loadpin/Kconfig                      |   4 +-
>>>   security/loadpin/loadpin.c                    |  28 +-
>>>   security/security.c                           | 351 +++++++++++++++---
>>>   security/selinux/hooks.c                      |  16 +-
>>>   security/smack/smack_lsm.c                    |   8 +-
>>>   security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c                      |   7 +-
>>>   security/yama/yama_lsm.c                      |   7 +-
>>>   24 files changed, 438 insertions(+), 175 deletions(-)
>>>
>>
> 
> 
>