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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJr8P_rS+DcQJxMM9xnB0vFFc75Xrk7Qv9yx8_DLB1Vjg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2018 16:49:57 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v3 18/29] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable=
On Mon, Oct 1, 2018 at 4:44 PM, John Johansen
<john.johansen@...onical.com> wrote:
> On 10/01/2018 04:30 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> If we keep it, "apparmor=0 lsm_enable=apparmor" would mean it's
>> enabled. Is that okay?
>>
> ugh I would rather get rid of apparmor=0 or to emit a warning with apparmor
> disabled, but if we have to live with it then yes I can live with last
> option wins
Removing it would be much preferred! :)
Assuming Paul is okay with the same results in SELinux, I'll prepare patches...
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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