linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH security-next v3 04/29] LSM: Remove initcall tracing

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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJsVv9bMh831yx1y8KjhgA204hkpOEVpWzvifATw-w0cw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Sun, 30 Sep 2018 18:01:29 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
Cc:     James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Abderrahmane Benbachir <abderrahmane.benbachir@...ymtl.ca>,
        linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
        John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
        Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v3 04/29] LSM: Remove initcall tracing

On Sun, Sep 30, 2018 at 4:25 PM, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org> wrote:
> On Wed, 26 Sep 2018 11:35:21 -0700
> Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Sep 26, 2018 at 9:35 AM, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org> wrote:
>> > On Mon, 24 Sep 2018 17:18:07 -0700
>> > Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>> >
>> >> This partially reverts commit 58eacfffc417 ("init, tracing: instrument
>> >> security and console initcall trace events") since security init calls
>> >> are about to no longer resemble regular init calls.
>> >
>> > I'm not against the change, but how much are they going to "no longer
>> > resemble regular init calls"?
>>
>> My take on "regular" init calls is that they're always run, link-time
>> ordered, etc. The changes proposed here will make it so not all
>> initialization are run depending on runtime configurations, ordering
>> will be flexible, etc.
>>
>
> Will it still be a good idea to have a tracepoint for those calls?
> Perhaps not an  initcall tracepoint but some other kind?

I'm not opposed. It could be a follow-up patch, I assume?

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security