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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1810020352030.9994@namei.org>
Date: Tue, 2 Oct 2018 03:58:52 +1000 (AEST)
From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
SE Linux <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
LKLM <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
"linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 00/19] LSM: Module stacking for SARA and Landlock
On Sun, 23 Sep 2018, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > How do you plan to handle LKM-based LSMs?
>
> My position all along has been that I don't plan to handle LKM
> based LSMs, but that I won't do anything to prevent someone else
> from adding them later. I believe that I've done that. Several
> designs, including a separate list for dynamically loaded modules
> have been proposed. I think some of those would work.
Dynamically loadable LSMs are a bad idea, per several previous
discussions. As a general design concept, kernel security mechanisms
should be invoked during boot, so we can reason about the overall state of
the system at a given point.
In any case, we do not need to take dynamic LSMs into account at this
stage. We don't build infrastructure for non-existent features.
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