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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+SwjKEFURa2ijYNkUYNj4jVd15QWj-u6cfpU-jVrjoew@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2018 21:47:39 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v4 13/32] LoadPin: Rename "enable" to "enforce"
On Mon, Oct 1, 2018 at 6:06 PM, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org> wrote:
> On 10/1/18 5:54 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> LoadPin's "enable" setting is really about enforcement, not whether
>> or not the LSM is using LSM hooks. Instead, split this out so that LSM
>> enabling can be logically distinct from whether enforcement is happening
>> (for example, the pinning happens when the LSM is enabled, but the pin
>> is only checked when "enforce" is set). This allows LoadPin to continue
>
> ISTB: when "enforcing" is set). ??
Whoops, thanks. And I need to do s/enable/enabled/ in the log. I'll fix this up.
-Kees
>
>> to operate sanely in test environments once LSM enable/disable is
>> centrally handled (i.e. we want LoadPin to be enabled separately from
>> its enforcement).
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
>> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>
>> ---
>> security/loadpin/Kconfig | 4 ++--
>> security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 21 +++++++++++----------
>> 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/security/loadpin/Kconfig b/security/loadpin/Kconfig
>> index dd01aa91e521..8653608a3693 100644
>> --- a/security/loadpin/Kconfig
>> +++ b/security/loadpin/Kconfig
>> @@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ config SECURITY_LOADPIN
>> have a root filesystem backed by a read-only device such as
>> dm-verity or a CDROM.
>>
>> -config SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENABLED
>> +config SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCING
>> bool "Enforce LoadPin at boot"
>> depends on SECURITY_LOADPIN
>> help
>> If selected, LoadPin will enforce pinning at boot. If not
>> selected, it can be enabled at boot with the kernel parameter
>> - "loadpin.enabled=1".
>> + "loadpin.enforcing=1".
>> diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
>> index 0716af28808a..d8a68a6f6fef 100644
>> --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
>> +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
>> @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file *file, char *operation)
>> kfree(pathname);
>> }
>>
>> -static int enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENABLED);
>> +static int enforcing = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCING);
>> static struct super_block *pinned_root;
>> static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock);
>>
>> @@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ static struct ctl_path loadpin_sysctl_path[] = {
>>
>> static struct ctl_table loadpin_sysctl_table[] = {
>> {
>> - .procname = "enabled",
>> - .data = &enabled,
>> + .procname = "enforcing",
>> + .data = &enforcing,
>> .maxlen = sizeof(int),
>> .mode = 0644,
>> .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
>> @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static void check_pinning_enforcement(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
>> loadpin_sysctl_table))
>> pr_notice("sysctl registration failed!\n");
>> else
>> - pr_info("load pinning can be disabled.\n");
>> + pr_info("enforcement can be disabled.\n");
>> } else
>> pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n");
>> }
>> @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
>>
>> /* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */
>> if (!file) {
>> - if (!enabled) {
>> + if (!enforcing) {
>> report_load(origin, NULL, "old-api-pinning-ignored");
>> return 0;
>> }
>> @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
>> * Unlock now since it's only pinned_root we care about.
>> * In the worst case, we will (correctly) report pinning
>> * failures before we have announced that pinning is
>> - * enabled. This would be purely cosmetic.
>> + * enforcing. This would be purely cosmetic.
>> */
>> spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
>> check_pinning_enforcement(pinned_root);
>> @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
>> }
>>
>> if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_root) || load_root != pinned_root) {
>> - if (unlikely(!enabled)) {
>> + if (unlikely(!enforcing)) {
>> report_load(origin, file, "pinning-ignored");
>> return 0;
>> }
>> @@ -186,10 +186,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>>
>> void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void)
>> {
>> - pr_info("ready to pin (currently %sabled)", enabled ? "en" : "dis");
>> + pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
>> + enforcing ? "" : "not ");
>> security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
>> }
>>
>> /* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
>> -module_param(enabled, int, 0);
>> -MODULE_PARM_DESC(enabled, "Pin module/firmware loading (default: true)");
>> +module_param(enforcing, int, 0);
>> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforcing, "Enforce module/firmware pinning");
>>
>
>
> --
> ~Randy
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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