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Message-ID: <CAAeHK+z2gBvmVsJUL+YFBZ==-AqQtwgi4u_HdBcQej-yhNdf4Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Oct 2018 15:42:26 +0200
From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
To: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@....com>,
Dave Martin <dave.martin@....com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@...gle.com>,
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Kate Stewart <kstewart@...uxfoundation.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
linux-sparse@...r.kernel.org,
Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
Linux Kbuild mailing list <linux-kbuild@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>,
Evgeniy Stepanov <eugenis@...gle.com>,
Lee Smith <Lee.Smith@....com>,
Ramana Radhakrishnan <Ramana.Radhakrishnan@....com>,
Jacob Bramley <Jacob.Bramley@....com>,
Ruben Ayrapetyan <Ruben.Ayrapetyan@....com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Mark Brand <markbrand@...gle.com>,
Chintan Pandya <cpandya@...eaurora.org>,
Vishwath Mohan <vishwath@...gle.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 19/20] kasan: update documentation
On Fri, Sep 21, 2018 at 5:13 PM, Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com> wrote:
> This patch updates KASAN documentation to reflect the addition of the new
> tag-based mode.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
> ---
> Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 232 ++++++++++++++++++------------
> 1 file changed, 138 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
> index aabc8738b3d8..a407e18afd32 100644
> --- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
> @@ -4,15 +4,25 @@ The Kernel Address Sanitizer (KASAN)
> Overview
> --------
>
> -KernelAddressSANitizer (KASAN) is a dynamic memory error detector. It provides
> -a fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and out-of-bounds
> -bugs.
> +KernelAddressSANitizer (KASAN) is a dynamic memory error detector designed to
> +find out-of-bound and use-after-free bugs. KASAN has two modes: generic KASAN
> +(similar to userspace ASan) and software tag-based KASAN (similar to userspace
> +HWASan).
>
> -KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
> -therefore you will need a GCC version 4.9.2 or later. GCC 5.0 or later is
> -required for detection of out-of-bounds accesses to stack or global variables.
> +KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation to insert validity checks before every
> +memory access, and therefore requires a compiler version that supports that.
>
> -Currently KASAN is supported only for the x86_64 and arm64 architectures.
> +Generic KASAN is supported in both GCC and Clang. With GCC it requires version
> +4.9.2 or later for basic support and version 5.0 or later for detection of
> +out-of-bounds accesses for stack and global variables and for inline
> +instrumentation mode (see the Usage section). With Clang it requires version
> +3.7.0 or later and it doesn't support detection of out-of-bounds accesses for
Note: this should actually be 7.0.0 and not 3.7.0 (as we need rL329612).
> +global variables yet.
> +
> +Tag-based KASAN is only supported in Clang and requires version 7.0.0 or later.
> +
> +Currently generic KASAN is supported for the x86_64, arm64 and xtensa
> +architectures, and tag-based KASAN is supported only for arm64.
>
> Usage
> -----
> @@ -21,12 +31,14 @@ To enable KASAN configure kernel with::
>
> CONFIG_KASAN = y
>
> -and choose between CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE and CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE. Outline and
> -inline are compiler instrumentation types. The former produces smaller binary
> -the latter is 1.1 - 2 times faster. Inline instrumentation requires a GCC
> -version 5.0 or later.
> +and choose between CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC (to enable generic KASAN) and
> +CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS (to enable software tag-based KASAN).
>
> -KASAN works with both SLUB and SLAB memory allocators.
> +You also need to choose between CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE and CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE.
> +Outline and inline are compiler instrumentation types. The former produces
> +smaller binary while the latter is 1.1 - 2 times faster.
> +
> +Both KASAN modes work with both SLUB and SLAB memory allocators.
> For better bug detection and nicer reporting, enable CONFIG_STACKTRACE.
>
> To disable instrumentation for specific files or directories, add a line
> @@ -43,85 +55,85 @@ similar to the following to the respective kernel Makefile:
> Error reports
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
> -A typical out of bounds access report looks like this::
> +A typical out-of-bounds access generic KASAN report looks like this::
>
> ==================================================================
> - BUG: AddressSanitizer: out of bounds access in kmalloc_oob_right+0x65/0x75 [test_kasan] at addr ffff8800693bc5d3
> - Write of size 1 by task modprobe/1689
> - =============================================================================
> - BUG kmalloc-128 (Not tainted): kasan error
> - -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> -
> - Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
> - INFO: Allocated in kmalloc_oob_right+0x3d/0x75 [test_kasan] age=0 cpu=0 pid=1689
> - __slab_alloc+0x4b4/0x4f0
> - kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x10b/0x190
> - kmalloc_oob_right+0x3d/0x75 [test_kasan]
> - init_module+0x9/0x47 [test_kasan]
> - do_one_initcall+0x99/0x200
> - load_module+0x2cb3/0x3b20
> - SyS_finit_module+0x76/0x80
> - system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17
> - INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001a4ef00 objects=17 used=7 fp=0xffff8800693bd728 flags=0x100000000004080
> - INFO: Object 0xffff8800693bc558 @offset=1368 fp=0xffff8800693bc720
> -
> - Bytes b4 ffff8800693bc548: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ........ZZZZZZZZ
> - Object ffff8800693bc558: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
> - Object ffff8800693bc568: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
> - Object ffff8800693bc578: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
> - Object ffff8800693bc588: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
> - Object ffff8800693bc598: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
> - Object ffff8800693bc5a8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
> - Object ffff8800693bc5b8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
> - Object ffff8800693bc5c8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkkkkkkkkkk.
> - Redzone ffff8800693bc5d8: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........
> - Padding ffff8800693bc718: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ
> - CPU: 0 PID: 1689 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B 3.18.0-rc1-mm1+ #98
> - Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
> - ffff8800693bc000 0000000000000000 ffff8800693bc558 ffff88006923bb78
> - ffffffff81cc68ae 00000000000000f3 ffff88006d407600 ffff88006923bba8
> - ffffffff811fd848 ffff88006d407600 ffffea0001a4ef00 ffff8800693bc558
> + BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmalloc_oob_right+0xa8/0xbc [test_kasan]
> + Write of size 1 at addr ffff8801f44ec37b by task insmod/2760
> +
> + CPU: 1 PID: 2760 Comm: insmod Not tainted 4.19.0-rc3+ #698
> + Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
> Call Trace:
> - [<ffffffff81cc68ae>] dump_stack+0x46/0x58
> - [<ffffffff811fd848>] print_trailer+0xf8/0x160
> - [<ffffffffa00026a7>] ? kmem_cache_oob+0xc3/0xc3 [test_kasan]
> - [<ffffffff811ff0f5>] object_err+0x35/0x40
> - [<ffffffffa0002065>] ? kmalloc_oob_right+0x65/0x75 [test_kasan]
> - [<ffffffff8120b9fa>] kasan_report_error+0x38a/0x3f0
> - [<ffffffff8120a79f>] ? kasan_poison_shadow+0x2f/0x40
> - [<ffffffff8120b344>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x14/0x40
> - [<ffffffff8120a79f>] ? kasan_poison_shadow+0x2f/0x40
> - [<ffffffffa00026a7>] ? kmem_cache_oob+0xc3/0xc3 [test_kasan]
> - [<ffffffff8120a995>] __asan_store1+0x75/0xb0
> - [<ffffffffa0002601>] ? kmem_cache_oob+0x1d/0xc3 [test_kasan]
> - [<ffffffffa0002065>] ? kmalloc_oob_right+0x65/0x75 [test_kasan]
> - [<ffffffffa0002065>] kmalloc_oob_right+0x65/0x75 [test_kasan]
> - [<ffffffffa00026b0>] init_module+0x9/0x47 [test_kasan]
> - [<ffffffff810002d9>] do_one_initcall+0x99/0x200
> - [<ffffffff811e4e5c>] ? __vunmap+0xec/0x160
> - [<ffffffff81114f63>] load_module+0x2cb3/0x3b20
> - [<ffffffff8110fd70>] ? m_show+0x240/0x240
> - [<ffffffff81115f06>] SyS_finit_module+0x76/0x80
> - [<ffffffff81cd3129>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17
> + dump_stack+0x94/0xd8
> + print_address_description+0x73/0x280
> + kasan_report+0x144/0x187
> + __asan_report_store1_noabort+0x17/0x20
> + kmalloc_oob_right+0xa8/0xbc [test_kasan]
> + kmalloc_tests_init+0x16/0x700 [test_kasan]
> + do_one_initcall+0xa5/0x3ae
> + do_init_module+0x1b6/0x547
> + load_module+0x75df/0x8070
> + __do_sys_init_module+0x1c6/0x200
> + __x64_sys_init_module+0x6e/0xb0
> + do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x2c0
> + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
> + RIP: 0033:0x7f96443109da
> + RSP: 002b:00007ffcf0b51b08 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000af
> + RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055dc3ee521a0 RCX: 00007f96443109da
> + RDX: 00007f96445cff88 RSI: 0000000000057a50 RDI: 00007f9644992000
> + RBP: 000055dc3ee510b0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000
> + R10: 00007f964430cd0a R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007f96445cff88
> + R13: 000055dc3ee51090 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
> +
> + Allocated by task 2760:
> + save_stack+0x43/0xd0
> + kasan_kmalloc+0xa7/0xd0
> + kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xe1/0x1b0
> + kmalloc_oob_right+0x56/0xbc [test_kasan]
> + kmalloc_tests_init+0x16/0x700 [test_kasan]
> + do_one_initcall+0xa5/0x3ae
> + do_init_module+0x1b6/0x547
> + load_module+0x75df/0x8070
> + __do_sys_init_module+0x1c6/0x200
> + __x64_sys_init_module+0x6e/0xb0
> + do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x2c0
> + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
> +
> + Freed by task 815:
> + save_stack+0x43/0xd0
> + __kasan_slab_free+0x135/0x190
> + kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10
> + kfree+0x93/0x1a0
> + umh_complete+0x6a/0xa0
> + call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0x4c3/0x640
> + ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
> +
> + The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801f44ec300
> + which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
> + The buggy address is located 123 bytes inside of
> + 128-byte region [ffff8801f44ec300, ffff8801f44ec380)
> + The buggy address belongs to the page:
> + page:ffffea0007d13b00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801f7001640 index:0x0
> + flags: 0x200000000000100(slab)
> + raw: 0200000000000100 ffffea0007d11dc0 0000001a0000001a ffff8801f7001640
> + raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080150015 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
> + page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
> +
> Memory state around the buggy address:
> - ffff8800693bc300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> - ffff8800693bc380: fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc
> - ffff8800693bc400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> - ffff8800693bc480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> - ffff8800693bc500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00
> - >ffff8800693bc580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 fc fc fc fc fc
> - ^
> - ffff8800693bc600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> - ffff8800693bc680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> - ffff8800693bc700: fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> - ffff8800693bc780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> - ffff8800693bc800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> + ffff8801f44ec200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> + ffff8801f44ec280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> + >ffff8801f44ec300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03
> + ^
> + ffff8801f44ec380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> + ffff8801f44ec400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> ==================================================================
>
> -The header of the report discribe what kind of bug happened and what kind of
> -access caused it. It's followed by the description of the accessed slub object
> -(see 'SLUB Debug output' section in Documentation/vm/slub.rst for details) and
> -the description of the accessed memory page.
> +The header of the report provides a short summary of what kind of bug happened
> +and what kind of access caused it. It's followed by a stack trace of the bad
> +access, a stack trace of where the accessed memory was allocated (in case bad
> +access happens on a slab object), and a stack trace of where the object was
> +freed (in case of a use-after-free bug report). Next comes a description of
> +the accessed slab object and information about the accessed memory page.
>
> In the last section the report shows memory state around the accessed address.
> Reading this part requires some understanding of how KASAN works.
> @@ -138,18 +150,24 @@ inaccessible memory like redzones or freed memory (see mm/kasan/kasan.h).
> In the report above the arrows point to the shadow byte 03, which means that
> the accessed address is partially accessible.
>
> +For tag-based KASAN this last report section shows the memory tags around the
> +accessed address (see Implementation details section).
> +
>
> Implementation details
> ----------------------
>
> +Generic KASAN
> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> +
> From a high level, our approach to memory error detection is similar to that
> of kmemcheck: use shadow memory to record whether each byte of memory is safe
> -to access, and use compile-time instrumentation to check shadow memory on each
> -memory access.
> +to access, and use compile-time instrumentation to insert checks of shadow
> +memory on each memory access.
>
> -AddressSanitizer dedicates 1/8 of kernel memory to its shadow memory
> -(e.g. 16TB to cover 128TB on x86_64) and uses direct mapping with a scale and
> -offset to translate a memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
> +Generic KASAN dedicates 1/8th of kernel memory to its shadow memory (e.g. 16TB
> +to cover 128TB on x86_64) and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to
> +translate a memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
>
> Here is the function which translates an address to its corresponding shadow
> address::
> @@ -162,12 +180,38 @@ address::
>
> where ``KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3``.
>
> -Compile-time instrumentation used for checking memory accesses. Compiler inserts
> -function calls (__asan_load*(addr), __asan_store*(addr)) before each memory
> -access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16. These functions check whether memory access is
> -valid or not by checking corresponding shadow memory.
> +Compile-time instrumentation is used to insert memory access checks. Compiler
> +inserts function calls (__asan_load*(addr), __asan_store*(addr)) before each
> +memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16. These functions check whether memory
> +access is valid or not by checking corresponding shadow memory.
>
> GCC 5.0 has possibility to perform inline instrumentation. Instead of making
> function calls GCC directly inserts the code to check the shadow memory.
> This option significantly enlarges kernel but it gives x1.1-x2 performance
> boost over outline instrumented kernel.
> +
> +Software tag-based KASAN
> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> +
> +Tag-based KASAN uses the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) feature of modern arm64 CPUs to
> +store a pointer tag in the top byte of kernel pointers. Like generic KASAN it
> +uses shadow memory to store memory tags associated with each 16-byte memory
> +cell (therefore it dedicates 1/16th of the kernel memory for shadow memory).
> +
> +On each memory allocation tag-based KASAN generates a random tag, tags the
> +allocated memory with this tag, and embeds this tag into the returned pointer.
> +Software tag-based KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation to insert checks
> +before each memory access. These checks make sure that tag of the memory that
> +is being accessed is equal to tag of the pointer that is used to access this
> +memory. In case of a tag mismatch tag-based KASAN prints a bug report.
> +
> +Software tag-based KASAN also has two instrumentation modes (outline, that
> +emits callbacks to check memory accesses; and inline, that performs the shadow
> +memory checks inline). With outline instrumentation mode, a bug report is
> +simply printed from the function that performs the access check. With inline
> +instrumentation a brk instruction is emitted by the compiler, and a dedicated
> +brk handler is used to print bug reports.
> +
> +A potential expansion of this mode is a hardware tag-based mode, which would
> +use hardware memory tagging support instead of compiler instrumentation and
> +manual shadow memory manipulation.
> --
> 2.19.0.444.g18242da7ef-goog
>
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