Message-ID: <9acb0cd2-66b0-1c41-b1a8-7c70608e9a9b@foss.arm.com>
Date:   Fri, 5 Oct 2018 10:04:50 +0100
From:   Ramana Radhakrishnan <ramana.radhakrishnan@...s.arm.com>
To:     Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@....com>,
        "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" 
        <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>
Cc:     Adam Wallis <awallis@...eaurora.org>,
        Amit Kachhap <Amit.Kachhap@....com>,
        Andrew Jones <drjones@...hat.com>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Catalin Marinas <Catalin.Marinas@....com>,
        Christoffer Dall <Christoffer.Dall@....com>,
        Dave P Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
        Jacob Bramley <Jacob.Bramley@....com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Marc Zyngier <Marc.Zyngier@....com>,
        Mark Rutland <Mark.Rutland@....com>,
        Suzuki Poulose <Suzuki.Poulose@....com>,
        Will Deacon <Will.Deacon@....com>,
        "kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu" <kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu>,
        "linux-arch@...r.kernel.org" <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 11/17] arm64: docs: document pointer authentication

On 05/10/2018 09:47, Kristina Martsenko wrote:
> From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
> 
> Now that we've added code to support pointer authentication, add some
> documentation so that people can figure out if/how to use it.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
> [kristina: update cpu-feature-registers.txt]
> Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@....com>
> Cc: Andrew Jones <drjones@...hat.com>
> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
> Cc: Ramana Radhakrishnan <ramana.radhakrishnan@....com>
> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
> ---
>   Documentation/arm64/booting.txt                |  8 +++
>   Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.txt  |  4 ++
>   Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.txt             |  5 ++
>   Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   4 files changed, 101 insertions(+)
>   create mode 100644 Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/booting.txt b/Documentation/arm64/booting.txt
> index 8d0df62c3fe0..8df9f4658d6f 100644
> --- a/Documentation/arm64/booting.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/arm64/booting.txt
> @@ -205,6 +205,14 @@ Before jumping into the kernel, the following conditions must be met:
>       ICC_SRE_EL2.SRE (bit 0) must be initialised to 0b0.
>     - The DT or ACPI tables must describe a GICv2 interrupt controller.
>   
> +  For CPUs with pointer authentication functionality:
> +  - If EL3 is present:
> +    SCR_EL3.APK (bit 16) must be initialised to 0b1
> +    SCR_EL3.API (bit 17) must be initialised to 0b1
> +  - If the kernel is entered at EL1:
> +    HCR_EL2.APK (bit 40) must be initialised to 0b1
> +    HCR_EL2.API (bit 41) must be initialised to 0b1
> +
>   The requirements described above for CPU mode, caches, MMUs, architected
>   timers, coherency and system registers apply to all CPUs.  All CPUs must
>   enter the kernel in the same exception level.
> diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.txt b/Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.txt
> index 7964f03846b1..b165677ffab9 100644
> --- a/Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.txt
> @@ -190,6 +190,10 @@ infrastructure:
>        |--------------------------------------------------|
>        | JSCVT                        | [15-12] |    y    |
>        |--------------------------------------------------|
> +     | API                          | [11-8]  |    y    |
> +     |--------------------------------------------------|
> +     | APA                          | [7-4]   |    y    |
> +     |--------------------------------------------------|
>        | DPB                          | [3-0]   |    y    |
>        x--------------------------------------------------x
>   
> diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.txt b/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.txt
> index d6aff2c5e9e2..95509a7b0ffe 100644
> --- a/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.txt
> @@ -178,3 +178,8 @@ HWCAP_ILRCPC
>   HWCAP_FLAGM
>   
>       Functionality implied by ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1.TS == 0b0001.
> +
> +HWCAP_APIA
> +
> +    EL0 AddPac and Auth functionality using APIAKey_EL1 is enabled, as
> +    described by Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt.
> diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt b/Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..8a9cb5713770
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt
> @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
> +Pointer authentication in AArch64 Linux
> +=======================================
> +
> +Author: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
> +Date: 2017-07-19
> +
> +This document briefly describes the provision of pointer authentication
> +functionality in AArch64 Linux.
> +
> +
> +Architecture overview
> +---------------------
> +
> +The ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication extension adds primitives that can be
> +used to mitigate certain classes of attack where an attacker can corrupt
> +the contents of some memory (e.g. the stack).
> +
> +The extension uses a Pointer Authentication Code (PAC) to determine
> +whether pointers have been modified unexpectedly. A PAC is derived from
> +a pointer, another value (such as the stack pointer), and a secret key
> +held in system registers.
> +
> +The extension adds instructions to insert a valid PAC into a pointer,
> +and to verify/remove the PAC from a pointer. The PAC occupies a number
> +of high-order bits of the pointer, which varies dependent on the
> +configured virtual address size and whether pointer tagging is in use.

s/pointer tagging/top byte ignore unless that's the terminology in the 
rest of the kernel documentation ?

> +
> +A subset of these instructions have been allocated from the HINT
> +encoding space. In the absence of the extension (or when disabled),
> +these instructions behave as NOPs. Applications and libraries using
> +these instructions operate correctly regardless of the presence of the
> +extension.
> +
> +
> +Basic support
> +-------------
> +
> +When CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH is selected, and relevant HW support is
> +present, the kernel will assign a random APIAKey value to each process
> +at exec*() time. This key is shared by all threads within the process,
> +and the key is preserved across fork(). Presence of functionality using
> +APIAKey is advertised via HWCAP_APIA.
> +
> +Recent versions of GCC can compile code with APIAKey-based return
> +address protection when passed the -msign-return-address option. This
> +uses instructions in the HINT space, and such code can run on systems
> +without the pointer authentication extension.

Just a clarification.

This uses instructions in the hint space for architecture levels less 
than armv8.3-a by default. If folks use -march=armv8.3-a you will start 
seeing the combined forms of retaa appear.

> +
> +The remaining instruction and data keys (APIBKey, APDAKey, APDBKey) are
> +reserved for future use, and instructions using these keys must not be
> +used by software until a purpose and scope for their use has been
> +decided. To enable future software using these keys to function on
> +contemporary kernels, where possible, instructions using these keys are
> +made to behave as NOPs.
> +
> +The generic key (APGAKey) is currently unsupported. Instructions using
> +the generic key must not be used by software.
> +
> +
> +Debugging
> +---------
> +
> +When CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH is selected, and relevant HW support is
> +present, the kernel will expose the position of TTBR0 PAC bits in the
> +NT_ARM_PAC_MASK regset (struct user_pac_mask), which userspace can
> +acqure via PTRACE_GETREGSET.
> +
> +Separate masks are exposed for data pointers and instruction pointers,
> +as the set of PAC bits can vary between the two. Debuggers should not
> +expect that HWCAP_APIA implies the presence (or non-presence) of this
> +regset -- in future the kernel may support the use of APIBKey, APDAKey,
> +and/or APBAKey, even in the absence of APIAKey.
> +
> +Note that the masks apply to TTBR0 addresses, and are not valid to apply
> +to TTBR1 addresses (e.g. kernel pointers).
> +
> +
> +Virtualization
> +--------------
> +
> +Pointer authentication is not currently supported in KVM guests. KVM
> +will mask the feature bits from ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, and attempted use of
> +the feature will result in an UNDEFINED exception being injected into
> +the guest.

However applications using instructions from the hint space will 
continue to work albeit without any protection (as they would just be 
nops) ?


regards,
Ramana


Reviewed-by: Ramana Radhakrishnan  <ramana.radhakrishnan@....com>

> 

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