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Message-Id: <20181008050130.GA4148@osiris>
Date: Mon, 8 Oct 2018 07:01:30 +0200
From: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>
To: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@....edu>
Cc: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@....edu>, Julian Wiedmann <jwi@...ux.ibm.com>,
Ursula Braun <ubraun@...ux.ibm.com>,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>,
"open list:S390 NETWORK DRIVERS" <linux-s390@...r.kernel.org>,
open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] s390/qeth: fix a missing-check bug
On Sat, Oct 06, 2018 at 11:08:23AM -0500, Wenwen Wang wrote:
> In qeth_snmp_command(), the length of the user request is firstly copied
> from the user-space buffer 'udata' to the kernel variable 'req_len' and
> checked to see whether it is too large. If the check fails, an error code
> EINVAL is returned. Otherwise, the execution continues and the whole buffer
> is copied again from 'udata' and saved to the kernel buffer 'ureq'.
> However, after the second copy, no re-check is enforced on the newly-copied
> request length. Given that the buffer 'udata' is in the user space, a
> malicious user can race to change the request length between the two
> copies. In this way, the attacker can supply malicious data to the kernel
> and cause undefined behavior.
>
> This patch adds a re-check on the request length after the second copy from
> the buffer 'udata'. If the newly-copied value is different from the value
> obtained in the first copy, i.e., 'req_len', an error code EINVAL will be
> returned after the buffer 'ureq' is freed.
>
> Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@....edu>
> ---
> drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c | 4 ++++
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c b/drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c
> index de82824..6199743 100644
> --- a/drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c
> +++ b/drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c
> @@ -4613,6 +4613,10 @@ static int qeth_snmp_command(struct qeth_card *card, char __user *udata)
> QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "snmpnome");
> return PTR_ERR(ureq);
> }
> + if (ureq->hdr.req_len != req_len) {
> + kfree(ureq);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
ureq->hdr.req_len is not used anywhere in the code, so could you please
explain what the undefined behavior is?
You could argue that adding a second sanity check may help to avoid
potential future bugs, but currently the code looks sane to me.
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