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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJ5RM6V3aS1SEznwLuDrjdYieaR3vwvgZA7nJ8i0J-Kkg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2018 15:36:31 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Christian Brauner <christian@...uner.io>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
"Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@...hat.com>,
Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] sysctl: handle overflow for file-max
On Tue, Oct 16, 2018 at 3:33 PM, Christian Brauner <christian@...uner.io> wrote:
> Hey,
>
> Here is v3 of this patchset. Changelogs are in the individual commits.
Thanks! These look good. Andrew, can you take these?
-Kees
>
> Currently, when writing
>
> echo 18446744073709551616 > /proc/sys/fs/file-max
>
> /proc/sys/fs/file-max will overflow and be set to 0. That quickly
> crashes the system.
>
> The first version of this patch intended to detect the overflow and cap
> at ULONG_MAX. However, we should not do this and rather return EINVAL on
> overflow. The reasons are:
> - this aligns with other sysctl handlers that simply reject overflows
> (cf. [1], [2], and a bunch of others)
> - we already do a partial fail on overflow right now
> Namely, when the TMPBUFLEN is exceeded. So we already reject values
> such as 184467440737095516160 (21 chars) but accept values such as
> 18446744073709551616 (20 chars) but both are overflows. So we should
> just always reject 64bit overflows and not special-case this based on
> the number of chars.
>
> (This patchset is in reference to https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/10/11/585.)
>
> Thanks!
> Christian
>
> [1]: fb910c42cceb ("sysctl: check for UINT_MAX before unsigned int min/max")
> [2]: 196851bed522 ("s390/topology: correct topology mode proc handler")
>
> Christian Brauner (2):
> sysctl: handle overflow in proc_get_long
> sysctl: handle overflow for file-max
>
> kernel/sysctl.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> --
> 2.17.1
>
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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