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Message-ID: <8736t6p1v0.fsf@linux.intel.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2018 14:28:19 +0300
From: Felipe Balbi <balbi@...nel.org>
To: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-usb@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] usb: gadget: storage: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
Hi Greg,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com> writes:
> num can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>
> drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c:3177 fsg_lun_make() warn:
> potential spectre issue 'fsg_opts->common->luns' [r] (local cap)
>
> Fix this by sanitizing num before using it to index
> fsg_opts->common->luns
>
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Can you still take this as an urgent fix?
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@...el.com>
--
balbi
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