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Message-ID: <20181017174527.GA107185@joelaf.mtv.corp.google.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2018 10:45:27 -0700
From: Joel Fernandes <joel@...lfernandes.org>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-team@...roid.com,
jreck@...gle.com, john.stultz@...aro.org, tkjos@...gle.com,
gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, dancol@...gle.com,
"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>,
Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@...cle.com>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
minchan@...gle.com, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] mm: Add an F_SEAL_FS_WRITE seal to memfd
On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 05:08:29AM -0700, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 03:39:58AM -0700, Joel Fernandes wrote:
> > > > This usecase cannot be implemented with the existing F_SEAL_WRITE seal.
> > > > To support the usecase, this patch adds a new F_SEAL_FS_WRITE seal which
> > > > prevents any future mmap and write syscalls from succeeding while
> > > > keeping the existing mmap active. The following program shows the seal
> > > > working in action:
> > >
> > > Where does the FS come from? I'd rather expect this to be implemented
> > > as a 'force' style flag that applies the seal even if the otherwise
> > > required precondition is not met.
> >
> > The "FS" was meant to convey that the seal is preventing writes at the VFS
> > layer itself, for example vfs_write checks FMODE_WRITE and does not proceed,
> > it instead returns an error if the flag is not set. I could not find a better
> > name for it, I could call it F_SEAL_VFS_WRITE if you prefer?
>
> I don't think there is anything VFS or FS about that - at best that
> is an implementation detail.
>
> Either do something like the force flag I suggested in the last mail,
> or give it a name that matches the intention, e.g F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE.
>
Ok, I agree. I like the name F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE you are proposing so I will
use that.
> > I could make it such that this seal would not be allowed unless F_SEAL_SHRINK
> > and F_SEAL_GROW are either previously set, or they are passed along with this
> > seal. Would that make more sense to you?
>
> Yes.
Cool.
> > > > static int memfd_add_seals(struct file *file, unsigned int seals)
> > > > {
> > > > @@ -219,6 +220,9 @@ static int memfd_add_seals(struct file *file, unsigned int seals)
> > > > }
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > + if ((seals & F_SEAL_FS_WRITE) && !(*file_seals & F_SEAL_FS_WRITE))
> > > > + file->f_mode &= ~(FMODE_WRITE | FMODE_PWRITE);
> > > > +
> > >
> > > This seems to lack any synchronization for f_mode.
> >
> > The f_mode is set when the struct file is first created and then memfd sets
> > additional flags in memfd_create. Then later we are changing it here at the
> > time of setting the seal. I donot see any possiblity of a race since it is
> > impossible to set the seal before memfd_create returns. Could you provide
> > more details about what kind of synchronization is needed and what is the
> > race condition scenario you were thinking off?
>
> Even if no one changes these specific flags we still need a lock due
> to rmw cycles on the field. For example fadvise can set or clear
> FMODE_RANDOM. It seems to use file->f_lock for synchronization.
Ok, I will acquire the f_lock before setting these, thanks for the
explanation. Will post updated patches today.
- Joel
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