[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20181019075740.GY3121@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2018 09:57:40 +0200
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to
enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection
On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 10:59:28AM -0700, Tim Chen wrote:
> Application to application exploit is in general difficult due to address
> space layout randomization in applications and the need to know an
Does the BTB attack on KASLR not work for userspace?
Powered by blists - more mailing lists