linux-kernel - Re: Interrupts, smp_load_acquire(), smp_store

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Date:   Sat, 20 Oct 2018 16:18:37 -0400 (EDT)
From:   Alan Stern <stern@...land.harvard.edu>
To:     "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.ibm.com>
cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        <davidtgoldblatt@...il.com>, <andrea.parri@...rulasolutions.com>,
        <will.deacon@....com>, <peterz@...radead.org>,
        <boqun.feng@...il.com>, <npiggin@...il.com>, <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        <j.alglave@....ac.uk>, <luc.maranget@...ia.fr>, <akiyks@...il.com>,
        <dlustig@...dia.com>
Subject: Re: Interrupts, smp_load_acquire(), smp_store_release(), etc.

On Sat, 20 Oct 2018, Paul E. McKenney wrote:

> The second (informal) litmus test has a more interesting Linux-kernel
> counterpart:
> 
> 	void t1_interrupt(void)
> 	{
> 		r0 = READ_ONCE(y);
> 		smp_store_release(&x, 1);
> 	}
> 
> 	void t1(void)
> 	{
> 		smp_store_release(&y, 1);
> 	}
> 
> 	void t2(void)
> 	{
> 		r1 = smp_load_acquire(&x);
> 		r2 = smp_load_acquire(&y);
> 	}
> 
> On store-reordering architectures that implement smp_store_release()
> as a memory-barrier instruction followed by a store, the interrupt could
> arrive betweentimes in t1(), so that there would be no ordering between
> t1_interrupt()'s store to x and t1()'s store to y.  This could (again,
> in paranoid theory) result in the outcome r0==0 && r1==0 && r2==1.

This is disconcerting only if we assume that t1_interrupt() has to be
executed by the same CPU as t1().  If the interrupt could be fielded by
a different CPU then the paranoid outcome is perfectly understandable,
even in an SC context.

So the question really should be limited to situations where a handler 
is forced to execute in the context of a particular thread.  While 
POSIX does allow such restrictions for user programs, I'm not aware of 
any similar mechanism in the kernel.

Alan