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Message-Id: <20181023184234.14025-11-chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2018 11:42:32 -0700
From: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@...el.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Markus T Metzger <markus.t.metzger@...el.com>,
Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
"Chang S . Bae" <chang.seok.bae@...el.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [v3 10/12] x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE by default and add a chicken bit
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Now that FSGSBASE is fully supported, remove unsafe_fsgsbase, enable
FSGSBASE by default, and add nofsgsbase to disable it.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@...el.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
---
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 35 ++++++++-----------
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index dfc2023b796b..72ed1a5ed832 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2729,8 +2729,7 @@
no5lvl [X86-64] Disable 5-level paging mode. Forces
kernel to use 4-level paging instead.
- unsafe_fsgsbase [X86] Allow FSGSBASE instructions. This will be
- replaced with a nofsgsbase flag.
+ nofsgsbase [X86] Disables FSGSBASE instructions.
no_console_suspend
[HW] Never suspend the console
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 6c54e6d2fdfb..f20edc754532 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -365,24 +365,21 @@ static __always_inline void setup_umip(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP);
}
-/*
- * Temporary hack: FSGSBASE is unsafe until a few kernel code paths are
- * updated. This allows us to get the kernel ready incrementally. Setting
- * unsafe_fsgsbase and TAINT_INSECURE flags will allow the series to be
- * bisected if necessary.
- *
- * Once all the pieces are in place, these will go away and be replaced with
- * a nofsgsbase chicken flag.
- */
-static bool unsafe_fsgsbase;
-
-static __init int setup_unsafe_fsgsbase(char *arg)
+static __init int x86_nofsgsbase_setup(char *arg)
{
- unsafe_fsgsbase = true;
- add_taint(TAINT_INSECURE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+ /* Require an exact match without trailing characters. */
+ if (strlen(arg))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Do not emit a message if the feature is not present. */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE))
+ return 1;
+
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE);
+ pr_info("nofsgsbase: FSGSBASE disabled\n");
return 1;
}
-__setup("unsafe_fsgsbase", setup_unsafe_fsgsbase);
+__setup("nofsgsbase", x86_nofsgsbase_setup);
/*
* Protection Keys are not available in 32-bit mode.
@@ -1372,12 +1369,8 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_umip(c);
/* Enable FSGSBASE instructions if available. */
- if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)) {
- if (unsafe_fsgsbase)
- cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE);
- else
- clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE);
- }
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE))
+ cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE);
/*
* The vendor-specific functions might have changed features.
--
2.19.1
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