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Message-ID: <20181024203548.glxgu3bqd47minmg@kafai-mbp>
Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2018 20:42:25 +0000
From: Martin Lau <kafai@...com>
To: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@....edu>
CC: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@....edu>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@...earbox.net>,
"open list:BPF (Safe dynamic programs and tools)"
<netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
"open list:BPF (Safe dynamic programs and tools)"
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] bpf: btf: Fix a missing-check bug
On Wed, Oct 24, 2018 at 06:22:46PM +0000, Martin Lau wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 24, 2018 at 05:26:23PM +0000, Martin Lau wrote:
> > On Wed, Oct 24, 2018 at 08:00:19AM -0500, Wenwen Wang wrote:
> > > In btf_parse(), the header of the user-space btf data 'btf_data' is firstly
> > > parsed and verified through btf_parse_hdr(). In btf_parse_hdr(), the header
> > > is copied from user-space 'btf_data' to kernel-space 'btf->hdr' and then
> > > verified. If no error happens during the verification process, the whole
> > > data of 'btf_data', including the header, is then copied to 'data' in
> > > btf_parse(). It is obvious that the header is copied twice here. More
> > > importantly, no check is enforced after the second copy to make sure the
> > > headers obtained in these two copies are same. Given that 'btf_data'
> > > resides in the user space, a malicious user can race to modify the header
> > > between these two copies. By doing so, the user can inject inconsistent
> > > data, which can cause undefined behavior of the kernel and introduce
> > > potential security risk.
> btw, I am working on a patch that copies the btf_data before parsing/verifying
> the header. That should avoid this from happening but that will
> require a bit more code churns for the bpf branch.
>
It is what I have in mind:
It is not a good idea to check the BTF header before copying the
user btf_data. The verified header may not be the one actually
copied to btf->data (e.g. userspace may modify the passed in
btf_data in between). Like the one fixed in
commit 8af03d1ae2e1 ("bpf: btf: Fix a missing check bug").
This patch copies the user btf_data before parsing/verifying
the BTF header.
Fixes: 69b693f0aefa ("bpf: btf: Introduce BPF Type Format (BTF)")
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com>
---
kernel/bpf/btf.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
index 378cef70341c..ee4c82667d65 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
@@ -2067,56 +2067,47 @@ static int btf_check_sec_info(struct btf_verifier_env *env,
return 0;
}
-static int btf_parse_hdr(struct btf_verifier_env *env, void __user *btf_data,
- u32 btf_data_size)
+static int btf_parse_hdr(struct btf_verifier_env *env)
{
+ u32 hdr_len, hdr_copy, btf_data_size;
const struct btf_header *hdr;
- u32 hdr_len, hdr_copy;
- /*
- * Minimal part of the "struct btf_header" that
- * contains the hdr_len.
- */
- struct btf_min_header {
- u16 magic;
- u8 version;
- u8 flags;
- u32 hdr_len;
- } __user *min_hdr;
struct btf *btf;
int err;
btf = env->btf;
- min_hdr = btf_data;
+ btf_data_size = btf->data_size;
- if (btf_data_size < sizeof(*min_hdr)) {
+ if (btf_data_size <
+ offsetof(struct btf_header, hdr_len) + sizeof(hdr->hdr_len)) {
btf_verifier_log(env, "hdr_len not found");
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (get_user(hdr_len, &min_hdr->hdr_len))
- return -EFAULT;
-
+ hdr = btf->data;
+ hdr_len = hdr->hdr_len;
if (btf_data_size < hdr_len) {
btf_verifier_log(env, "btf_header not found");
return -EINVAL;
}
- err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(btf_data, sizeof(btf->hdr), hdr_len);
- if (err) {
- if (err == -E2BIG)
- btf_verifier_log(env, "Unsupported btf_header");
- return err;
+ /* Ensure the unsupported header fields are zero */
+ if (hdr_len > sizeof(btf->hdr)) {
+ u8 *expected_zero = btf->data + sizeof(btf->hdr);
+ u8 *end = btf->data + hdr_len;
+
+ for (; expected_zero < end; expected_zero++) {
+ if (*expected_zero) {
+ btf_verifier_log(env, "Unsupported btf_header");
+ return -E2BIG;
+ }
+ }
}
hdr_copy = min_t(u32, hdr_len, sizeof(btf->hdr));
- if (copy_from_user(&btf->hdr, btf_data, hdr_copy))
- return -EFAULT;
+ memcpy(&btf->hdr, btf->data, hdr_copy);
hdr = &btf->hdr;
- if (hdr->hdr_len != hdr_len)
- return -EINVAL;
-
btf_verifier_log_hdr(env, btf_data_size);
if (hdr->magic != BTF_MAGIC) {
@@ -2186,10 +2177,6 @@ static struct btf *btf_parse(void __user *btf_data, u32 btf_data_size,
}
env->btf = btf;
- err = btf_parse_hdr(env, btf_data, btf_data_size);
- if (err)
- goto errout;
-
data = kvmalloc(btf_data_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!data) {
err = -ENOMEM;
@@ -2198,13 +2185,18 @@ static struct btf *btf_parse(void __user *btf_data, u32 btf_data_size,
btf->data = data;
btf->data_size = btf_data_size;
- btf->nohdr_data = btf->data + btf->hdr.hdr_len;
if (copy_from_user(data, btf_data, btf_data_size)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto errout;
}
+ err = btf_parse_hdr(env);
+ if (err)
+ goto errout;
+
+ btf->nohdr_data = btf->data + btf->hdr.hdr_len;
+
err = btf_parse_str_sec(env);
if (err)
goto errout;
--
2.17.1
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