linux-kernel - [Patch v4 13/18] security: Update security level of a process when modifying its dumpability

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Message-Id: <e8b6b10e15653b3b2c5727e935f75142e441f834.1540923609.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Tue, 30 Oct 2018 11:49:20 -0700
From:   Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc:     Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
        Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
        Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>,
        Waiman Long <longman9394@...il.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org
Subject: [Patch v4 13/18] security: Update security level of a process when modifying its dumpability

When a process is made non-dumpable, the action implies a higher level
of security implicitly as its memory is imposed with access restriction.

A call to update_process_security() is added to update security defenses
according to a process's dumpability and its implied security level.

Architecture specific defenses is erected for threads in the process
by calling arch_set_security(task, SECURITY_LEVEL_HIGH) or the defenses
relaxed via arch_set_security(task, SECURITY_LEVEL_NORMAL).  Such defenses
may incur extra overhead and is reserved for tasks needing high security.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
---
 fs/exec.c                |  2 ++
 include/linux/security.h |  6 ++++++
 kernel/cred.c            |  5 ++++-
 kernel/sys.c             |  1 +
 security/security.c      | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 1ebf6e5..e70c8a7 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1366,6 +1366,8 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 	else
 		set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
 
+	update_process_security(current);
+
 	arch_setup_new_exec();
 	perf_event_exec();
 	__set_task_comm(current, kbasename(bprm->filename), true);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 75f4156..469d05f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ struct mm_struct;
 /* LSM Agnostic defines for sb_set_mnt_opts */
 #define SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS	1
 
+/* Security level */
+#define SECURITY_NORMAL	0
+#define SECURITY_HIGH	1
+
+extern int update_process_security(struct task_struct *task);
+
 struct ctl_table;
 struct audit_krule;
 struct user_namespace;
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index ecf0365..0806a74 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #if 0
 #define kdebug(FMT, ...)						\
@@ -445,8 +446,10 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
 	    !uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) ||
 	    !gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) ||
 	    !cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) {
-		if (task->mm)
+		if (task->mm) {
 			set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
+			update_process_security(task);
+		}
 		task->pdeath_signal = 0;
 		smp_wmb();
 	}
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index cf5c675..c6f179a 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -2293,6 +2293,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
 			break;
 		}
 		set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2);
+		update_process_security(me);
 		break;
 
 	case PR_SET_UNALIGN:
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 736e78d..12460f2 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/backing-dev.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/coredump.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
 #include <net/flow.h>
 
 #include <trace/events/initcall.h>
@@ -1353,6 +1355,35 @@ int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
 
+void __weak arch_set_security(struct task_struct *task,
+			      unsigned int security_level)
+{
+}
+
+int update_process_security(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct task_struct *t;
+	int security_level;
+
+	if (!task->mm)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!lock_task_sighand(task, &flags))
+		return -ESRCH;
+
+	if (get_dumpable(task->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
+		security_level = SECURITY_HIGH;
+	else
+		security_level = SECURITY_NORMAL;
+
+	for_each_thread(task, t)
+		arch_set_security(task, security_level);
+
+	unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 
 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
-- 
2.9.4