[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20181102122937-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2018 12:59:40 -0400
From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: mark.rutland@....com, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
kvm@...r.kernel.org, virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
bijan.mottahedeh@...cle.com, gedwards@....com, joe@...ches.com,
lenaic@...ard.fr, liang.z.li@...el.com, mhocko@...nel.org,
mhocko@...e.com, stefanha@...hat.com, wei.w.wang@...el.com,
Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PULL] vhost: cleanups and fixes
On Fri, Nov 02, 2018 at 09:14:51AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 2, 2018 at 6:04 AM Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@...hat.com> wrote:
> >
> > I've tried making access_ok mask the parameter it gets.
>
> PLEASE don't do this.
Okay.
> Just use "copy_to/from_user()".
Just for completeness I'd like to point out for vhost the copies are
done from the kernel thread. So yes we can switch to copy_to/from_user
but for e.g. 32-bit userspace running on top of a 64 bit kernel it is
IIUC not sufficient - we must *also* do access_ok checks on control path
when addresses are passed to the kernel and when current points to the
correct task struct.
> We have had lots of bugs because code bitrots.
Yes, I wish we did not need these access_ok checks and could just rely
on copy_to/from_user.
> And no, the access_ok() checks aren't expensive, not even in a loop.
> They *used* to be somewhat expensive compared to the access, but that
> simply isn't true any more. The real expense in copy_to_user and
> friends are in the user access bit setting (STAC and CLAC on x86),
> which easily an order of magnitude more expensive than access_ok().
>
> So just get rid of the double-underscore version. It's basically
> always a mis-optimization due to entirely historical reasons. I can
> pretty much guarantee that it's not visible in profiles.
>
> Linus
OK. So maybe we should focus on switching to user_access_begin/end +
unsafe_get_user/unsafe_put_user in a loop which does seem to be
measureable. That moves the barrier out of the loop, which seems to be
consistent with what you would expect.
--
MST
Powered by blists - more mailing lists